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You read some of these stories about college players who undergo some of 
these . . . problems with concussions and so forth and then have nothing to 
fall back on.  That’s something that I’d like to see the NCAA think about.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As understanding regarding the severity of head injuries and 
concussions in football increased dramatically,2 President Obama entered the 
fray early in 2013 when, among other things, he called on the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to “think about” concussions and 
injuries in college football.3  President Obama’s involvement is not the first 
instance of a president calling for reform in college football due to severe 
injuries.  At the turn of the twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt 
responded to the tragic deaths of eighteen college football players in 1904.4  
President Roosevelt called on university leaders to participate in a White 
House Conference that was called to deal with the problem of injuries and 
deaths in college football through the development of safety rules.5  
Roosevelt, no doubt, was also responding to concerns raised in the press, 
including a 1903 article in the New York Times referring to college football 
as “‘mayhem and homicide.’”6  
College leaders heeded President Roosevelt’s call by gathering and 
eventually adopting new safety rules, although it took over a decade for the 
new football rules to be put in place.7  As one commentator put it, those 
 
 1.  Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, O2, NEW REPUBLIC, February 11, 2013, at 22, 29 (statement 
of President Obama) (“[I]f I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I let him play football.  
And I think that those of us who love the sport are going to have to wrestle with the fact that it will 
probably change gradually to try to reduce some of the violence.”), available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president#. 
 2.  See infra notes 38–116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development and 
heightening of concerns regarding head injuries in college football. 
 3.  Foer & Hughes, supra note 1, at 29.  
 4.  Paul M. Barrett, Pain Point, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 4–Feb. 10, 2013, at 52, 54 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-31/will-brain-injury-lawsuits-doom-or-
save-the-nfl. 
 5.  MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW: GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 100 (3rd ed. 
2012). 
 6.  Barrett, supra note 4, at 54. 
 7.  See, e.g., Marc Edelman & David Rosenthal, A Sobering Conflict: The Call for Consistency 
in the Message Colleges Send About Alcohol, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1389, 
1399 (2010) (noting that “[i]n the NCAA’s early years, the Association’s leaders resolved many of 
President Roosevelt’s safety concerns” and that “in 1916, the NCAA instituted a formal code of 
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initial reform efforts “led to the formation of a Rules Committee and the 
formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, which, in 1910, was 
renamed the [National Collegiate Athletic Association].”8  With these rule 
changes and the eventual formation of the NCAA, a major early twentieth 
century crisis, that threatened the very existence of football, was averted. 
Perhaps not so ironically, just over a century later, in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, we face a new but similar crisis that threatens 
football at all levels.9  That crisis has been fueled by scientific and medical 
studies that are making it increasingly clear that concussions and sub-
concussions, or repeated trauma to the head, suffered regularly in football, 
contribute to subsequent brain injuries and impairment.10  Litigation and 
legislative, administrative, or executive action has followed in response to 
these studies, particularly with regard to the National Football League 
(NFL).11  The NCAA has also been subjected to litigation over these issues.12  
If plaintiffs are successful in such litigation, as they could well be as public 
concerns regarding the treatment of student-athletes intensify, the costs 
associated with such litigation and other governmental demands may render 
football, particularly at the amateur level, unaffordable, both economically 
and in terms of the gravity of injuries to participants.13  
College football at the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) level is made 
up of teams from major universities that play football at the most 
competitive level in college.14  FBS teams are considered as possible 
participants in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS).15  The BCS and its 
FBS members are involved in producing college football games at a highly 
 
safety and ethics that extended beyond just football and to all collegiate sports.”).  
 8.  MATTHEW J. MITTEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (2011). 
 9.  Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem and Saving Professional Football, 35 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 127, 129 (2013) [hereinafter Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem].  
 10.   Id. at 127, 130–33. 
 11.  Id. at 147, 159–60, 172–75. 
 12.  See Complaint at ¶ 1, Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11CV06356, 2011 WL 4374451 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/ 
1:2011cv06356/259901/1/. 
 13.  See Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 147–61. 
 14.  BCS Background, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809699 (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2013) (“The Bowl Championship Series (BCS) is a five-game showcase of college 
football.  It is designed to ensure that the two top-rated teams in the country meet in the national 
championship game, and to create exciting and competitive matchups among eight other highly 
ranked teams in four other [premiere] bowl games.”).  
 15.  Id.  
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commercial and financially lucrative level.16  In 2011–12, for example, the 
football program at the University of Texas generated $103.8 million in 
revenue and an astounding $77.9 million in net profit.17  The University of 
Michigan, which was second in net revenue, generated a healthy $61.6 
million in net profit, with the Universities of Georgia and Florida each 
generating over $50 million in net profit.18   
In 2010, the BCS, which is generally considered to be the major national 
championship in NCAA football, generated $1.2 billion in revenues for host 
cities and “also distributed $142,500,000 to participating athletic 
departments.”19  The overall “payout for the five 2011 BCS bowls [wa]s 
$230,237,000.”20  And, for the year of 2011, “eight BCS bowl coaches 
received an additional $1,864,000 because their teams are playing in a BCS 
bowl game.”21  Yet, as one commentator noted, “BCS players, the main bowl 
ingredient, receive $250 to $500 gift bags for their work leading up to and 
participation in BCS bowl games. . . . [which generate] billions [of dollars in 
revenues] for universities, coaches, and host cities.”22  The voices of critics 
will grow harsher and calls for paying players will increase as media 
revenue for the BCS grows to as much as $500 million in 2014, a figure that 
is more than triple the $150 million currently being paid by ESPN for media 
rights to broadcast the bowl series.23 
In reporting reminiscent of the media’s strong indictment of college 
football in the early twentieth century, the New York Times recently 
questioned what is happening in college football and reported that the 
NCAA is experiencing “tumultuous days” as “calls for reform grow 
 
 16.  See Kristi Dosh, Texas Tops in Football Profit, Revenue, ESPN.COM (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2556/texas-tops-in-football-profit-revenue. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Emmett Gill, Da Season for Distribution: A 2012 BCS Revenue Sharing Plan, BLACK 
ATHLETE SPORTS NETWORK (Jan. 3, 2012), http://blackathlete.net/2012/01/da-season-for-
distribution-a-2012-bcs-revenue-sharing-plan/. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS National Championship, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013) 
[hereinafter Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS], http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/ 
01/07/the-money-behind-the-bcs-national championship/ (“The network pays more than $150 
million per year for the rights to all five BCS bowls.  And those paychecks will only get bigger as 
college football moves to a playoff system for the 2014 season.  ESPN is in the process of securing 
the playoff TV rights, and many expect the network will eventually have to pay somewhere in the 
neighborhood of $500 million annually for them.”). 
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louder.”24  Much attention has focused on the NCAA’s handling of its 
enforcement process, particularly after a mishandling by the NCAA of an 
investigation at the University of Miami25 and questions regarding the 
NCAA’s process in strongly sanctioning Penn State University.26  Other 
critics focus on the refusal to compensate players, who produce revenues 
providing millions of dollars in profit to institutions.27  This revenue is often 
used to provide very competitive compensation to coaches and athletics 
personnel.28  
Rather than joining in the pay-for-play debate, however, this article 
focuses primarily on a critique of the NCAA’s current treatment of student 
welfare issues related primarily to head injuries suffered by student-athletes 
participating in college football.  In response to those issues, this article 
raises safety, enforcement, and compensation concerns and offers a game 
plan for dealing constructively with those issues.   
The NCAA is rightfully concerned about its reputation, as the leader in 
intercollegiate athletics.  Those concerns will surely be heightened as issues 
related to student welfare receive increased media attention.  Josephine 
Potuto, former chair of the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions recently 
declared she could not “recall a time when there has been less optimism 
about the [NCAA] and how it operates.”29  Potuto added, “[w]hether that’s 
on merit, or a confluence of events hitting at the same time, the fact is 
there’s an overwhelming feeling that everything is wrong.”30  President 
Mark Emmert, who has led the NCAA since 2010 and receives an annual 
compensation that has been reported at over $1.6 million per year,31 recently 
 
 24.  Greg Bishop, Tumultuous Days for N.C.A.A.’s President as the Calls for Reform Grow 
Louder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/sports/ncaafootball/calls-
for-reform-grow-louder-for-ncaa-and-mark-emmert.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“In the past 
month, the N.C.A.A. and its president, Mark Emmert, have been sued, criticized and ridiculed—and 
more than usual.  They were embarrassed by admitted mistakes in a high-profile investigation.  Their 
critics, growing louder and in number, included a governor, state senators, lawyers, academics and 
university presidents.”). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  See generally Matthew Mitten, The Penn State “Consent Decree”: The NCAA’s Coercive 
Means Don’t Justify Its Laudable Ends, But Is There a Legal Remedy?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 321 (2014). 
 27. .See David Berri, What Sports Illustrated Didn’t Tell You About Paying College Athletes, 
HUFFINGTON POST SPORTS—THE BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 8:05PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
david-berri/paying-college-athletes_b_1089102.html. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Steve Berkowitz, NCAA President Mark Emmert Paid at Nearly $1.6M per Year, USA 
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acknowledged that “‘[t]he frustration is you take two steps forward on the 
reform agenda and something explodes and you get knocked back.  We’re 
making great progress, but it has been much more tumultuous than any of us 
expected.’”32   
If the NCAA proactively addresses student health and welfare issues 
associated with head injuries in big-time football, it will deal with one of the 
most tumultuous challenges that it faces and will revitalize confidence in its 
brand as a student-oriented enterprise.33  The NCAA and its member 
institutions—the colleges and universities that make up the NCAA—have 
not consistently lived up to their own constitution, which, in describing its 
“basic purpose,” extols amateurism and the student-athlete: 
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are 
designed to be a vital part of the educational system.  A basic 
purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as 
an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line 
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.34 
In order to achieve this educational and student-centered purpose, the 
NCAA Constitution sets forth the objective of student-athlete well-being: 
“[i]ntercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner 
designed to protect and enhance the physical and educational well-being of 
student-athletes.”35  In enhancing the physical well-being of student-athletes, 
the constitution further mandates that, “[i]t is the responsibility of each 
member institution to protect the health of, and provide a safe environment 
 
TODAY (July 9, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-07-09/NCAA-
Mark-Emmert-salary/56117864/1. 
 32.  Bishop, supra note 24. 
 33.  Cf. Cailyn Reilly, Comment, The NCAA Needs Smelling Salts When It Comes to Concussion 
Regulation in Major College Athletics, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 245, 290–91 (2012) (making the 
point that “[b]y failing to properly address the dangers of concussions in contact sports, the NCAA 
has revealed itself to be an inefficient and obtuse organization, yet it remains in the unique position 
of being able to provide for the safety of its student-athletes”).  
 34.  NCAA CONST.  art. 1.3.1, reprinted in 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1  (effective 
Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ 
productdownloads/D114.pdf.  
 35.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
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for, each of its participating student-athletes.”36  Finally, in order to achieve 
such a safe environment each member institution must “foster[] a positive 
relationship between the student-athlete and coach.”37 
This article sets forth a challenging but viable game plan for protecting 
the health and well-being of intercollegiate football players.  Acting 
proactively will help revitalize the NCAA’s brand of competitive, student-
centered athletics.  This article consists of three parts: The Problem of Head 
Injuries in College Football; Solving the Problem of Head Injuries in 
College Football; and Conclusion. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF HEAD INJURIES IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL 
The NCAA has made significant progress in dealing with catastrophic 
injuries since the early 1900s when deaths were common in college 
football.38  From 2004 to 2009, for example, “there were no fatalities from 
direct catastrophic injuries in NCAA football.”39  However, “[n]ationwide, 
across all sports levels, there have been more deaths from heat stroke in the 
2005–2009 time block than any other five-year block during the past 35 
years.”40  The NCAA, in turn, reports that, “[t]he overall injury rate in 
NCAA football is 8.1 injuries per 1,000 athlete exposures (games and 
practices combined)” and that “[t]here were more than 41,000 injuries and 
25 million athlete exposures from 2004 to 2009.”41  Of those injuries 7.4% 
were concussions and 4.3% were head, face, and neck injuries.42  
The percentage of recorded concussions and head related injuries is 
significant, but it is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of brain damage or 
injury, much of which appears only years after the concussive and sub-
concussive blows or head trauma that caused it.43  In a recent debate 
 
 36.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 37.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 38.  See Football’s Death Record for 1907, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 1907), 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D0CE7D6103EE033A25757C2A9679D94669 
7D6CF; Nineteen Killed on Gridiron, THE S.F. CALL, Nov. 27, 1905, at 1, available at 
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1905-11-27/ed-1/seq-1/. 
 39.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES: DATA FROM THE 2004/05–2008/09 SEASONS, NCAA 1, 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/08/02/NCAA_Football%20Injuries.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2013) [hereinafter NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES].  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Terry Zeigler, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE), SPORTSMD, 
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regarding whether college football should be banned, noted author Malcolm 
Gladwell emphasized that it is “the continuous small blows to the brain that 
are creating the damning evidence being found in the brains of former 
football players.”44  Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy,45 the evidence of 
brain damage found in the brains of many former football players, “is not the 
product of massive concussions, rather it is borne through repetitive sub-
concussive blows.”46  A football player may suffer thousands of such blows 
over the course of time when they are actively participating in football.47 
 This article focuses on head injuries suffered in college football, many 
of which are latent, appearing as dementia later in life.48  A major lawsuit 
has been filed against the NFL to seek to recover for losses related to those 
brain injuries.49  The NCAA has been sued by a group of former players as 
well.50  President Obama entered the fray, directing his comments primarily 
to the NCAA and indicating his expectation that they will deal with these 
issues.51  Even Congress has become increasingly interested in the issue of 
brain injuries and trauma related to football.52  One of the defenses asserted 
by the NFL in the lawsuit brought by former players against the association 
is that it is not clear that blows suffered in the NFL are any more likely to be 
the cause of brain injury than injuries incurred by blows to the head that 
occurred at the collegiate, high school, and youth levels.53  What is clear, 
however, is that college football, like the NFL, high school, and youth 
 
http://www.sportsmd.com/Articles/id/44.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
 44.  Michael Felder, Sub-Concussive Blows Are the True Danger in College Football, 
BLEACHER REPORT (May 9, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1177616-college-football-sub-
concussive-blows-are-the-true-danger-in-college-football. 
 45.  Zeigler, supra note 43 (“Chronic traumatic encephalopathy is a degenerative brain disease 
that results in behaviors similar to Alzheimer’s disease (AD).  However, according to researchers, 
CTE has a clear environmental cause (repeated brain trauma) rather than a genetic cause.  In other 
words, CTE is the only preventable form of dementia.”). 
 46.  Felder, supra note 44  (“Those little hits.  The constant banging on the offensive and 
defensive line.  The running back being tackled every play as he carries the ball over 200 times a 
season.  The linebacker who is putting up 125 tackles.  Those are not all concussions, but they are 
repetitive sub-concussive blows to the head that are the building blocks of CTE.”). 
 47.   See Anahad O’Connor, Head Injuries on the Football Field, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (Sept. 
8, 2011), well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/head-blows-on-the-football-field/. 
 48.  Zeigler, supra note 43. 
 49.  Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 136. 
 50.  See infra notes 92–104 and accompanying text.  
 51.  See supra note 1.  
 52.  See Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 136, 143, 145, 172–80. 
 53.  See id. at 149 & n.118, 164. 
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football, is a source of brain trauma that may lead to CTE later in the life of 
a former football player.54 
As noted previously, the NCAA was formed, in part, in response to fatal 
head and other injuries that occurred early in the twentieth century.55  Over 
the years, the NCAA has responded by creating a variety of safety rules 
designed to better protect the health and safety of student-athletes.56  The 
NCAA’s response to injuries, including head injuries, has generally been 
successful albeit a bit slow in coming.57  It was not until 1916, for example, 
more than a decade after the deaths of the eighteen college football players 
that led to the intervention of President Roosevelt, that the first NCAA 
Football Rules Code was “developed and published.”58  Twenty-three more 
years passed before college players were required to wear helmets in 1939.59  
Another twenty-five years passed before a player was no longer permitted to 
“deliberately and maliciously use his helmet or head to butt or ram an 
opponent.”60  Almost another decade passed before the NCAA acted again, 
in 1973, requiring college football players to wear mouth guards.61  Just 
three years later in 1976, college football players were prohibited from 
spearing—”the deliberate use of the helmet in an attempt to punish the 
opponent.”62  It took almost two more decades before the NCAA published 
its first set of Concussion Guidelines in 1994.63  In 1996, in an effort to 
further protect college football players from head injuries, the NCAA 
adopted a rule requiring a play to be blown dead if the ball carrier’s helmet 
comes off.64  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a series of new 
safety related rules were adopted by the NCAA: 2002 (a “defenseless 
player” is defined to provide added protection);65 2003 (a preseason 
 
 54.  See id. at 164. 
 55.  See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text. 
 56.  See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.   NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 2; see also supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
 59.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 2.  Requiring helmets may have contributed 
to an increase in head trauma because the helmet is now often considered to be a weapon that can be 
used to strike a blow or aid in tackling another player.  See id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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schedule, together with more extensive medical examinations for 
participation, are mandated for safety purposes);66 2006 (“[e]ye shields must 
be completely clear to allow for quick medical diagnoses of student-
athletes”);67 2008 (“[t]he horse-collar tackle is [declared to be] illegal; 
players [are] protected from a chop-block; and [more] focus [was placed] on 
eliminating hits on defenseless players and blows to the head”);68 and 2010 
(concussion management plans were mandated in that “any injured player 
[must now] be removed from play and cleared by medical personnel before 
returning to play,” and certain “blocking schemes on kick plays” were also 
limited).69 
The NCAA is to be applauded for its increasing commitment over the 
past decade to do more to protect football players from serious head injuries.  
It is not surprising, given increased knowledge regarding the severity of 
brain-related injuries, that the NCAA has acted more decisively in the past 
decade to protect student-athletes playing college football from injuries, 
including serious head injuries.  It is clear, however, that more must be done. 
To better understand why the NCAA has acted and why it will have to 
do more in the future to protect its student-athletes playing football, a short 
summary of the development of scientific and medical knowledge regarding 
brain trauma suffered in football and other major contact sports will be 
helpful.70  Given that protective helmets were not required until 1939, it is 
evident that an appreciation of the consequences of head trauma in college 
football was slow in developing.71 
Well before 1939, it was clear in boxing that repeated blows to the head 
could result in brain damage—referred to as dementia pugilistica.72  
Dementia pugilistica is defined as, “a syndrome affecting boxers that is 
caused by cumulative cerebral injuries and is characterized by impaired 
cognitive processes (as thinking and remembering), parkinsonism, impaired 
and often slurred speech, and slow poorly coordinated movements especially 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  See, e.g., Smith,  Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 132–33.  The short 
summary in this article is derived from a lengthier discussion of brain trauma and injuries appearing 
in an article written by the author in the Thomas Jefferson Law Review.  See generally id. 
 71.  See  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 2. 
 72.  Id. at 130. 
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of the legs.”73  As early as 1928, in an article published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, Dr. Harrison S. Marland found early 
symptoms of brain injury in boxers due to repeated blows or trauma to the 
head.74   
From 1928 to 2002, there was a general and growing recognition that 
serious and repeated blows to the head could give rise to serious brain 
injuries.75  This increased understanding manifested itself in the adoption of 
various NCAA rules between 1939 and 2002, beginning with the 
requirement that players wear helmets, which was implemented in 1939.76  
By 1994, the NCAA recognized the significance of brain trauma when it 
published an initial set of concussion guidelines.77  In 2003, the NCAA 
performed a major study involving 2905 college football players in which 
they concluded that players who “have suffered concussions are more 
susceptible to further [head trauma] for . . . seven to ten days after the . . . 
injury.”78  A study at The Center for the Study of Retired Athletes (CSRA) at 
the University of North Carolina found “a link between multiple concussions 
and depression among former [NFL and collegiate] players.”79  A 2005 study 
by the CSRA found “a connection between concussions and both brain 
impairment and Alzheimer’s disease among retired NFL players.”80  
Recognition of the seriousness of head trauma, including concussions, was 
growing in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
An even more significant set of studies were developing at the same 
time—studies that were evidencing the connection between sub-concussive 
blows to the head and brain injury taking the form of CTE later in life.  In 
2002, a forensic pathologist, Dr. Bennet Omalu, studied the brains of a 
number of former football players, including Mike Webster, and found clear 
 
 73.  Dementia Puglilistica Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/medical/dementia%20pugilistica (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 74.  Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1103, 1103 (1928). 
 75.  Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 131–32. 
 76.  See  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 2. 
 77.  See id.; Travis Waldron, The NCAA’s History with Concussions: A Timeline, THINK 
PROGRESS (July 23, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2013/07/23/2339571/ncaa-concussion-
timeline/. 
 78.  Chris Simmons, Casper’s Way:  NFL Should Face Concussion Problem, THE MIRROR (Mar. 
21, 2007), http://fairfieldmirror.com/2007/03/21/casperswaynflshouldfaceconcussionproblem/. 
 79.  Pellman Steps Down as NFL’s Top Concussion Expert, ESPN (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2782445. 
 80.  Id. 
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evidence of CTE,81 which “interferes with memory and anger control [and] 
can cause dementia and death.”82  Other studies followed and the connection 
between repeated blows (trauma) to the head suffered in a football game and 
CTE has become much clearer.83  Studies had multiplied, and in 2010 Dr. 
Omalu emphatically testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary 
that “permanent brain damage and dementia following repeated blows to the 
head is a . . . generally accepted principle in medicine.”84  Dr. Omalu closed 
his testimony by pleading for more action to protect football players at all 
levels.85 
The case of Mike Webster is illustrative.  Webster died at the age of 
fifty, after suffering from dementia, amnesia, and depression.86  After his 
death and as a result of the Omalu study, Webster’s estate successfully 
brought a lawsuit against the NFL in the United States District Court for 
Maryland and was awarded over $1.6 million in disability payments, 
interest, and fees.87  The NFL appealed the ruling; but, on December 13th, 
2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
judge’s ruling.88  
Before playing for over a decade in the NFL, Webster had a highly 
successful collegiate career at the University of Wisconsin.89  Clearly, 
repeated blows to the head (head trauma) suffered during his collegiate 
career at Wisconsin, a major Big Ten university, contributed to his CTE.90  
Indeed, some doctors estimated Webster had been in the equivalent of 
 
 81.  Jeanne Marie Laskas, Game Brain, GQ (Oct. 2009), http://www.gq.com/sports/ 
profiles/200909/nfl-players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions. 
 82.  Barrett, supra note 4, at 55.  
 83.  Liz Neporent, Football Head Injuries Increasing Because of Bigger, Faster Players, ABC 
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/football-head-injuries-increasing-bigger-faster-
players/story?id=18183735#.UZsRqZVMafQ. 
 84.  Legal Issues Related to Football Head Injuries, Pt. II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (written statement of Bennet Omalu, MD, Co-Director, Brain Injury 
Research Institute), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-82_530 
92.PDF.  
 85.  Id. at 7. 
 86.  Greg Garber, A Tormented Soul, ESPN (Jan. 24, 2005), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1972285. 
 87.  Jani v. Bell, 2005 LEXIS 44331, 12–13 (D. Md. 2005), enforcing 2005 LEXIS 10150, 17 
(D. Md.).   
 88.  Jani v. Bell, 209 F. App’x 305, 319–20 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 89.  Hall of Famers:  Mike Webster, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, 
http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?PLAYER_ID=227 (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
 90.  See Barrett, supra note 4, at 55. 
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“‘25,000 car crashes’” in over twenty-five years of playing football at the 
high school, college, and professional levels.91 
In September of 2011, Adrian Arrington, who played college football at 
Eastern Illinois University, filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA 
alleging that the NCAA failed to adequately protect its student-athletes from 
concussions and head injuries.92  In the first allegation in the complaint, 
Arrington alleges:  
For over 30 years, the NCAA has failed its student-athletes—
choosing instead to sacrifice them on an altar of money and profits.  
The NCAA has engaged in a long-established pattern of negligence 
and inaction with respect to concussions and concussion-related 
maladies sustained by its student-athletes, all the while profiting 
immensely from those same student-athletes.93 
Arrington alleges further that he suffered five concussions, which 
resulted in “memory loss, migraine headaches, depression, and seizures.”94  
He “faults the NCAA for not adopting tougher rules on certain on-the-field 
plays that are more likely to result in head injuries.”95   The Chicago Tribune 
recently reported that Arrington’s attorney, Joe Siprut, sought class-action 
status96 for the lawsuit “focusing on the NCAA . . . because its officials 
knew as early as 2003 that multiple concussions could lead to health 
problems, yet did not require colleges to have concussion policies until 
2010.”97  According to the Tribune:  
The lawsuit claims that after Arrington’s first three concussions, 
Eastern’s team doctor told him he could get back on the field the 
 
 91.  NFL Players Donating Their Brains to Science: Mike Webster, CBS NEWS, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2300-204_162-10007027-2.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
 92.  Libby Sander, Former Football Player Sues NCAA over Concussion Policies, CHRONICLE 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Sep. 19, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/former-football-player-
sues-ncaa-over-concussion-policies/36408 (based on an AP report); see Complaint, supra note 12, at 
¶ 1. 
 93.  Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶ 1. 
 94.  John Keilman, Ex-College Football Player Claims Concussions Ruined His Life, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 4, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-04/news/ct-met-college-
concussion-20130104_1_multiple-concussions-concussion-policies-class-action-status. 
 95.  Sander, supra note 92. 
 96.  Keilman, supra note 94. 
 97.  Id. 
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next day.  The team sent him to a neurologist only after he started to 
experience seizures, he alleges, and even then he continued to play, 
suffering two more concussions before leaving the team near the 
end of his senior season.98  
The NCAA has denied liability in the Arrington case by responding that 
it has taken serious action regarding concussions, including having provided 
for concussion guidelines in 1994 and by requiring concussion management 
plans beginning in 201099—the year prior to the filing of Mr. Arrington’s 
suit,100 but after Arrington ceased playing football at Eastern Illinois 
University.101  In its defense the NCAA also asserts that “each school is 
responsible for protecting the health of its players, and that athletes sign 
forms in which they acknowledge the risk of concussions.”102  Christopher 
Radford, speaking on behalf of the NCAA, noted further that the NCAA 
advises teams on the best practices of managing concussion and head 
injuries.103  Radford added, “‘[t]he NCAA has great compassion for student 
athletes who are injured as a result of training, practice or competition, 
which fuels our desire to make student athlete safety our top priority.’”104 
With the Arrington lawsuit—which largely sounds in negligence—the 
NCAA has joined the NFL in having to defend against litigation that, if 
successful, could have a significant economic impact on the NCAA and its 
member institutions.105  Even if not successful, such litigation brings 
undesired negative attention to the NCAA’s weaker-than-hoped-for response 
to the health and safety issues related to head injuries.106  
The NCAA may also find itself subject to a worker’s compensation 
lawsuit in a state like California, where the legislature recently passed SB 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.   Cf. Complaint, supra note 12, at ¶ 22–24; Keilman, supra note 94; Waldron, supra note 77.  
 100.  Complaint, supra note 12. 
 101.  Id. at ¶ 25–27 (noting that Arrington played for Eastern Illinois University from 2006–
2009). 
 102.  Keilman, supra note 94. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  See Ken Belson, Concussion Liability Costs May Rise, and Not Just for N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/sports/football/insurance-liability-in-nfl-
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 106.  Cf.  George Vecsey, College Athletes Move Concussions into the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/sports/ncaafootball/college-players-move-
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1525 establishing a “Student-Athlete Bill of Rights.”107  The legislation 
provides benefits, including extended scholarships and insurance for needy 
student-athletes, at major revenue-producing schools in California, including 
UCLA, UC Berkeley, Stanford, and the University of Southern California.108  
As a matter of policy, there is only a short step from providing benefits of 
the sort provided in SB 1525 to providing workers’ compensation benefits 
for players at major, revenue-producing universities in California.109  Indeed, 
California seems to be moving toward a policy of treating student-athletes in 
major revenue-producing programs in the state more like employees, which 
could open up the possibility of filing a successful workers’ compensation 
claim in the state.110  Such claims would, in all likelihood, be brought against 
the university and not the NCAA, but it would be a cause for major concern 
on the part of the NCAA and its membership.111 
On August 1, 2013, Representatives Charlie Dent (R-Pennsylvania) and 
Joyce Beatty (D-Ohio) introduced H.R. 2903, the National Collegiate 
Athletics Accountability Act, which illustrates willingness on the part of 
some members of Congress to hold the NCAA accountable for the manner 
in which it treats student-athletes and member institutions under the 
NCAA’s enforcement process.112 If adopted, the Act would terminate 
billions of dollars in federal aid, in the form of Title IV funding for 
qualifying colleges and universities, if an institution fails to protect student-
athletes and universities in keeping with the provisions of the Act. The 
proposed Act mandates annual baseline concussion tests for student-athletes 
participating in contact or limited-contact sports. It also mandates an 
irrevocable four-year scholarship for student-athletes participating in contact 
sports, with scholarships being guaranteed in the event of loss of athletic 
 
 107.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67450 (West 2013); SB 1525 – Establishes a Student Athlete Bill of 
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California have been awarded worker’s compensation in the California worker’s compensation 
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 110.  Cf. generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71 (2006).  
 111.  See generally id. 
 112.  National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act, H.R. 2903, 113th Cong. (2013), available 
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skill or injury. In an apparent response to the NCAA’s sanctioning of Penn 
State University, without a formal hearing, the Act seeks to guarantee that 
all student-athletes and universities will have the opportunity for a formal 
administrative hearing prior to the implementation of any NCAA 
punishment for an alleged rules violation, under the NCAA’s enforcement 
process. It is unlikely that this Act will be adopted, but it does evidence a 
willingness on the part of members of Congress to hold the NCAA 
accountable.  
With the threat of litigation and strong concern being expressed by 
President Obama and others, including members of Congress, it is not 
surprising that the NCAA has become more assertive in dealing with the 
problem of head injuries in college football.  Such a posture is in keeping 
with its own constitutionally mandated obligation to provide for student-
welfare.113  Despite its many critics, the NCAA’s response may be well 
intended, although criticism that the NCAA tends to be reactive and to move 
too slowly in protecting and providing for its student-athletes is justified.114  
Taking proactive and more dramatic steps is also a strong defensive 
strategy—a means of avoiding the major losses that the NCAA and its 
member institutions could incur in litigation.115  Acting to protect and 
provide for student-athletes playing college football, particularly at the FBS 
and BCS level, will also help the NCAA maintain its student-centered 
brand.116  Just as when academic leaders responded to concerns over deaths 
in college football in the early twentieth century, action now, in the early 
stages of the twenty-first century, to address student-athlete welfare issues 
related to head trauma may help save college football and revitalize the 
NCAA’s student-centered brand. 
III.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF HEAD INJURIES 
In order to deal with the various issues regarding head injuries, the 
NCAA will have to adopt significant reform in two areas: (1) improving 
safety, through stronger rules and implementation of an enforcement process 
designed to ensure that the rules are enforced; and (2) caring for former 
college football players who have suffered from traumatic head injuries or 
 
 113.  See generally NCAA CONST., reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34. 
 114.  See Reilly, supra note 33, at 274–76.  
 115.  See Belson, supra note 105. 
 116.  See generally Reilly, supra note 33.  
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blows suffered while playing football at an NCAA member institution.  
A.  Improving Safety 
The NCAA has adopted rules designed to protect players from head 
injuries, particularly concussions.117  The NCAA has also taken steps to 
increase the professional nature of medical care provided to players, by 
mandating improved protocols for dealing with concussions and providing 
more authority or latitude for medical and training professionals serving 
athletes.118  In addition to adopting rules designed to protect and provide 
improved care for student-athletes, the NCAA mandated a new preseason 
schedule in 2003, recognizing that the “preseason has the highest injury rate 
(9.7 per 1,000 athlete exposures) compared with in-season (7.5) and the 
postseason (4.2)” and that “[t]he greatest incidence for adverse events such 
as fatalities, heat illness and collapse is more often during transitions such as 
the first and second day of preseason and after a break period from 
practice.”119  It is clear, however, that more safety and scheduling rules, 
designed to deal with head trauma, must be adopted if the health and safety 
of student-athletes is to be adequately protected. 
1.  Safety Rules and Strengthening Medical Care and Protocols 
To develop meaningful changes in the rules which will protect against 
head injuries, the NCAA must begin to gather data regarding head trauma 
(concussions and sub-concussions) suffered by position (line, linebacker, 
defensive back, running back, quarterback, etc.) and type of play (special 
teams, general play, running play, passing play, etc.).  Studies should also be 
undertaken to evaluate equipment and ensure that the players are required to 
use the safest equipment.  Rule changes must be data driven.  Rules must 
also be assessed on a regular basis to ensure that they are achieving their 
intended result. 
The NCAA has evidenced an increased willingness to engage in the 
scientific studies necessary to make wise policy to protect its student-
athletes from head injuries.  For example, on March 15, 2013, “[i]n an effort 
to expand its commitment to the health and safety of its student-athletes, the 
 
 117.  See supra notes 55–69 and accompanying text. 
 118.  See infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 119.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 1. 
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NCAA announced it will participate in an unprecedented strategic alliance 
formed by the NFL and [General Electric (GE)] to facilitate innovation and 
advance research into brain injuries.”120  The NCAA’s release notes further 
that “NCAA president Mark Emmert said the strategic alliance is an 
extension of the NCAA’s 107-year-old founding mission to protect the 
health and well-being of student-athletes.”121  The NFL, GE, and Under 
Armour are funding the project, with the NCAA playing a supportive role:  
The NCAA will support research funded by the partnership by 
providing scientists with opportunities to study concussions and 
their effects beyond the football field, the sport that has brought the 
injury’s detrimental effects to the forefront of health and safety 
discussions.  The NCAA will encourage its member institutions to 
participate in the initiative by having medical staff who work with 
their student-athletes speak with the students about volunteering for 
study.122  
The NCAA must, however, play more than a supportive role—it must 
allocate resources to such studies, particularly given that many NCAA 
members have research institutions and medical schools attached to them.123 
The NFL has funded a project with the National Institutes of Health and has 
joined with the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) to fund a study that is 
underway at the Harvard Medical School.124  The NCAA should follow the 
NFL’s example by aggressively supporting research regarding head trauma. 
It is clear that the NCAA, the BCS, major conferences, and universities 
must do more to support and sponsor research regarding the head injuries.  
The NCAA’s increased willingness to gather information is, nevertheless, a 
positive sign.  Data already gathered by the NCAA reveals that 13.6% of all 
competition injuries occur during special teams play—kickoffs, punts, field 
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goals, and point-after attempts.125  The NCAA would be wise to consider and 
then implement strong rules limiting contact in special teams play.  An even 
more dramatic change would be to simply do away with special teams play 
if the data warrants such a move.  Such a dramatic change would no doubt 
be opposed by purists, who would argue that eliminating special teams play 
would change the dynamic of the game.126  Every rule change—and there 
have been many over the years—changes the dynamic of play to some 
extent.127  The real question is whether the benefit outweighs the cost.  The 
chance to reduce injuries by almost fifteen percent with a simple change, 
like eliminating special teams play,128 could well be worth the price.  Short 
of making such a dramatic rule change, the NCAA must, at a minimum, 
gather data indicating the nature and extent of injuries suffered in special 
teams play to determine what specific rules might be adopted to minimize 
those injuries.  
To develop meaningful rules, the NCAA needs data and must do more 
to fund the collection of it, particularly data related to head trauma in 
football.  It will also have access to studies being done by the NFL and 
others,129 which will provide a basis for wise rulemaking designed to protect 
the welfare of student-athletes.  Without access to such data, it is beyond the 
scope of this article and the competence of its author to suggest specific rule 
changes, but such changes must be forthcoming if the NCAA is to protect its 
student-athletes. 
Existing data regarding head injuries is suggestive of additional areas 
where rule changes would better protect student-athletes, and the NFL has 
been a leader in this area.130  The NCAA has been gathering data regarding 
concussions in football for a number of years and it should use that data 
more aggressively.  According to the NCAA’s own statistics, concussions in 
college football continually increased over a twenty-one-year period from 
 
 125.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 2. 
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the 1980s,131 without much action on the part of the NCAA or its members.  
The NCAA seems to draw some solace from the fact that the number of 
concussions has remained fairly consistent since 2004, at a rate of 2.5 
concussions per 1000 game-related exposures.132  David Klossner, NCAA 
Director of Health and Safety, opined:  
Given the increased awareness and sensitivity to concussions by 
coaches, athletes and medical staff over the last few years, a level 
rate of concussions is encouraging as we anticipated a spike in the 
data set . . . .  Although we do not yet have enough information to 
draw final conclusions, these data are important to monitor trends as 
we strive to make competition and practice safer for our student-
athletes in all sports.133 
Klossner is right about the need to continue studying concussions; but, 
the NCAA takes undue solace in the fact that the rate of concussions remains 
essentially constant with the high-water mark reached a decade ago.134  
Studying concussions and taking solace in statistics that remain at a level 
that warrants grave concern, even though they have leveled off, is not 
enough.  The NCAA must be more engaged in efforts to determine the 
impact of repeated concussive and sub-concussive blows suffered during 
practices and games and must cease to place the burden on schools to deal 
with the health issues that arise as a result of those blows.135  Indeed, the 
failure by the NCAA to address sub-concussive trauma is deeply 
troublesome. 
When data is gathered, at the associational, conference, and institutional 
member levels, as it must be, it should be used in the rulemaking process to 
formulate and assess the effectiveness of rules.  Information, by institution, 
should also be disclosed to student-athletes and their families in the letter of 
intent or signing process.  If an institution has a higher incidence of injuries, 
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the player and his family should be aware of that fact before signing.136 
The NCAA should also be attentive to studies being done by others.  For 
example, Dr. Omalu has recommended that a student-athlete receiving a 
concussion should be held out for more than two weeks, perhaps as long as 
three months.137  In developing its policies, the NCAA should resist the 
pressure to get student-athletes back on the field after a concussion and 
should be conservative in determining when to permit a player to return to 
play.138  This is an area where reliance on the members—universities and 
coaches—themselves is ill-placed, given the incentive to play an injured 
student-athlete to win a game.139  
Another area where the NCAA has taken some initial strides to protect 
the health and welfare of its student-athletes is in requiring management 
plans or protocols for dealing with head injuries.  In 2010, the NCAA 
mandated concussion management plans.140  Previously, in 2003, the NCAA 
mandated participation in medical exams and, in 2010, it created a 
requirement that any injured player be cleared by medical personnel before 
being permitted to return to play.141 
In December of 2012, the Committee on Competitive Safeguards and 
Medical Aspects of Sports (CSMAS) developed a policy statement 
addressing misperceptions regarding the effectiveness of equipment 
designed to provide protective benefits against concussions and made it clear 
that “the NCAA would not provide medical waivers for the use of the 
equipment to prevent concussions in order to medically clear student-
athletes for play.”142  David Klossner, NCAA Director of Health and Safety, 
emphasized that, “[t]he committee wanted to clearly state that these devices 
should not be used to permit medical clearance of a student-athlete to play 
their sport for the prevention of concussions or if they would otherwise not 
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be medically cleared to participate due to a concussion.”143  The NCAA has 
also developed a fact sheet regarding concussions for coaches.144 
The NCAA’s fact sheet recommends a four-step process when a player 
has suffered a head injury or possible concussion: 
1.  Remove the student-athlete from play. . . .  Do not allow the 
student-athlete to just “shake it off.”  Each individual athlete will 
respond to concussions differently. 
2.  Ensure that the student-athlete is evaluated right away by an 
appropriate health care professional . . . . 
3.  Allow the student-athlete to return to play only with permission 
from a health care professional with experience in evaluating for 
concussion . . . . 
4.  Develop a game plan.145 
 If institutions were required—not just advised—to follow this simple 
four-step rule, there would be a reduction in multiple concussions or 
concussions followed by serious sub-concussive blows, the very harm 
disclosed in the NCAA’s 2003 concussion study.146 Unfortunately, the 
NCAA’s recommended four-step process is little more than a guideline, the 
violation of which is not subject to the NCAA’s enforcement sanctions.147 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the NCAA has been criticized for 
doing too little and delegating too much authority to coaches and medical 
personnel at the institutional level.148  In a particularly damning article, Dan 
Diamond, a Forbes contributor, recently criticized the University of 
Arizona, and its coaching staff, for permitting its quarterback to “play[] 
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through an almost-certain concussion” in order to win an important game.149 
Diamond put it this way: 
To be fair, it was [Arizona’s] biggest victory in two whole years.  
And the NCAA’s not going to penalize [Arizona], so why protect 
your player?  It’s not like we’ve learned anything about football and 
head injuries.  
. . . . 
[Arizona’s star quarterback] was showing tell-tale signs of 
concussion, and the NCAA—which is being sued for failing to 
implement appropriate concussion screening, return-to-play 
guidelines, and other safety measures—is pretty clear on what 
coaches should do next: “Take [an athlete] out of play immediately 
and allow adequate time for evaluation by a health care professional 
experienced in evaluating for concussion.”150 
The University of Arizona and its coaching staff apparently ignored the 
NCAA’s recommended four-step process for dealing with serious head 
trauma, and the NCAA did nothing to intervene.151  Sadly, this “washing of 
the hands”152 approach is the NCAA’s primary defense in the Arrington 
case153—they argue that member institutions are responsible for enforcing 
safety protocols, thereby seeking to absolve the Association of all 
responsibility for the failure of coaches and member institutions to live up to 
these standards.154  Yet, the NCAA will enforce recruiting and related rules 
to ensure that the schools maintain “a level playing field,” or competitive 
equity—matters that are arguably necessary to maintain the profitability of 
big-time college football.155  Evidently, competitive equity warrants 
Associational enforcement, but student safety and welfare does not.  It seems 
 
 149.   Id. 
 150.  Id (alterations in original). 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  See Matthew 27:24. 
 153.   See supra notes 99–100, 102 and accompanying text. 
 154.  See supra notes 99–100, 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 155.  See Gary Brown, Board Adopts Tougher, More Efficient Enforcement Program, NCAA 
(Oct. 30, 2012), https:/www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2012/ 
october/board+adopts+tougher+more+efficient+enforcement+program. 
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that schools that disregard the four-step process for dealing with head trauma 
not only disregard student-athlete welfare, but they also gain a competitive 
advantage over schools that adhere to that process.156  If a school disregards 
the process and keeps its star quarterback on the field, and another team 
pulls its star quarterback because it follows the process, the school playing 
its “injured” quarterback may well gain a very significant competitive 
advantage, which may, in turn, result in financial gain to the university that 
disregards the protocols.157 
2.  Scheduling Games and Practices 
It is clear that fewer games and contact practices would decrease the 
number of injuries and would probably have the single greatest effect of any 
rule change in terms of limiting concussive and sub-concussive trauma.158  
Sub-concussive trauma (the play-after-play hits or blows to the head) is the 
major cause of CTE.159  FBS football powers currently play twelve to 
fourteen games in a season.160  A drop from twelve to ten games and a 
shortening of the season would clearly have a more positive impact on 
student welfare, both in terms of limiting injuries and increasing time for 
study and academic success for student-athletes, than any other single 
proposal that might be adopted.161  With their emphasis on student welfare, 
NCAA D-III schools often schedule as few as eight games in a season, with 
the possibility of playing in the postseason.162 
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, given that more games mean more 
revenue for big-time college FBS football programs, it is unlikely that the 
 
 156.  See Diamond, supra note 145. 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  Patrick Hruby, Head Games, SPORTS ON EARTH (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/40980196/; Gregg Easterbrook, Football Finally Focusing on 
Practice, ESPN PLAYBOOK (Aug. 14, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/playbook/story/_/id/ 
8265669/pop-warner-rules-limiting-contact-practice-show-football-taking-head-injuries-seriously. 
 159.  What is CTE?, BOS.UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF TRAUMATIC ENCEPHALOPATHY, 
http://www.bu.edu/cste/about/what-is-cte/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 160.  See, e.g., Michael Felder, More Games for College Football Teams Should Not Be an 
Option, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 30, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1507902-more-
games-for-college-football-teams-should-not-be-an-option. 
 161.  See Hruby, supra note 158. 
 162.   For example, Amherst, a major D-III football program, only scheduled eight games in 2013.  
See, e.g., 2013 Schedule, AMHERST COLLEGE: FOOTBALL SCHEDULE/RESULTS (2013), 
https://www.amherst.edu/athletics/teams/fall/football/schedule. 
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NCAA and its members who benefit financially from adding games will do 
the right thing for their student-athletes and reduce the number of games 
played and the length of the season—and thereby limiting the number of 
practices as well.163  Rather, it appears that there may be more pressure to 
expand the number of regular season games for FBS schools, from twelve to 
thirteen games, than to decrease it to nine or ten games.164  The Big Ten, for 
example, voted in February of 2013 to expand the number of league games 
from eight to ten, resulting in some arguing for adding a game to the regular 
season.165  More league contests will mean more revenue for most Big Ten 
schools.166  Nevertheless, some Big Ten schools want more home games, 
because home games are very profitable, which will increase pressure to add 
a regular season game to the schedule in order to accommodate the 
conference’s desire to increase the number of conference games.167 
It appears unlikely, for economic reasons, that the NCAA will trim the 
length of the season for FBS schools, which would be the one thing that 
could do more than any other single act to help protect the health and safety 
of its student-athletes.168  Fewer games would translate into fewer incidences 
of head trauma among football players.169  As was the case with the NCAA’s 
intransigence or reluctance to enforce safety rules, however, we see another 
instance—in the case of scheduling—of the reality that the NCAA, 
particularly at the FBS level, is driven more by revenue maximization than 
 
 163.  See Easterbrook, supra note 158; Dan Wetzel, The People’s Voice: College Football 
Playoffs, YAHOO SPORTS (Nov. 29, 2007), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/peoples-voice-college-
football-playoffs-140600791—ncaaf.html. 
 164.  Dave Wischnowsky, Does College Football Need a 13-Game Regular Season?, CBS 
CHICAGO (Feb. 16, 2013), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/02/16/wisch-does-college-football-
need-a-13-game-regular-season/. 
 165.  Adam Rittenberg, Big 10 to Increase League Games, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Feb. 11, 
2013, 7:11 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8937704/big-ten-increase-number-
league-games-eight. 
 166.  See id. (referencing the impact of the Big Ten’s new schedule on television and revenue 
agreements). 
 167.  Id.; cf. Big Ten Coaches Aren’t Sold on a Nine-Game Conference Schedule, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Aug. 5, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/430197-big-ten-coaches-arent-sold-on-a-
nine-game-conference-schedule. 
 168.  See Easterbrook, supra note 158; see also Wischnowsky, supra note 164. 
 169.  See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text; see also Easterbrook, supra note 158; cf. 
Wischnowsky, supra note 164 (“[W]ith football currently in the crosshairs of the many critics who 
are concerned about the long-term health implications of the sport, the NCAA adding another game 
to its schedule may not be the most well received idea right now. . . .  With health issues factored in, 
I’m not convinced that a 13-game regular season would be the best move for the NCAA . . . .”). 
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by student welfare concerns.170 
Nevertheless, at a minimum, the NCAA should form a committee to 
examine the benefits and costs of shortening the season to protect student-
athletes.171  It might, for example, prove revenue-positive to create a national 
championship, involving sixteen teams, and shorten the regular season for 
all FBS teams by two games, particularly if revenues generated are shared to 
help address losses by universities that are not participating in the 
postseason.172  If economic concerns can be addressed, it is possible that the 
length of the season could be shortened, thereby limiting the incidence of 
head trauma for college football players.173 
The NCAA should also take steps to limit the number of contact 
practices, thereby reducing incidences of head trauma.174  Limiting practices 
may not be as effectual, however, as limiting the number of games played.175  
According to the NCAA’s own statistics, “[f]ootball players are nearly seven 
times more likely to be injured during a game than in practice.”176  It is worth 
noting, however, that in case of head trauma or sub-concussive events that 
may lead to CTE later in life, the number of hits to the head—and not 
whether they occurred in practice or in a game—is of primary concern.177  
Reducing the number of contact practices should, therefore, have a 
significant impact in reducing the number of sub-concussive blows to the 
head of college football players.178 
 
 170.  See, e.g., Kevin Kelley, The Hawaii Exemption, FBSCHEDULES.COM (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.fbschedules.com/2010/05/the-hawaii-exemption/ (explaining that the NCAA allows for a 
“Hawaii Exemption” whereby Division I football teams that play at Hawaii are allowed to schedule 
a thirteenth game, usually at home, thus creating extra revenue). 
 171.  See Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 138.  The NCAA could model 
its approach to committee formation on that of the NFL, which “formed committees and otherwise 
acted in response to a growing sense of concern regarding head injuries on the part of former and 
current players.”  Id.  
 172.  See infra Part III.A.4.b. 
 173.  See infra Part III.A.4.b. 
 174.  See, e.g., Michael Cohen, Syracuse Football Experienced Fewer Concussions with Revised 
Practice Format in 2012, SYRACUSE.COM POWERED BY: THE POST-STANDARD (July 22, 2013, 
10:15 AM), http://www.syracuse.com/orangefootball/index.ssf/2013/07/syracuse_football_ 
experienced.html (praising Syracuse football for reducing the number of full-contact practices to 
prevent concussive injuries). 
 175.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 1. 
 176.   Id. 
 177.  See What is CTE, supra note 159. 
 178.  See Cohen, supra note 174. 
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3.  Enforcing Safety Rules 
The NCAA must do much more than it has done to date to enforce 
safety rules, guidelines, and protocols.179  It is unlikely that any new safety 
rules, particularly in the form of protocols, will be of much impact unless 
they are vigorously enforced.180  There is a culture in college football that 
makes it unlikely that schools will strictly enforce concussion management 
plans or other safety rules and protocols at the institutional level.181  Players 
are often praised for “playing through injuries” as illustrated by the 
following 2011 report regarding the University of Michigan’s Taylor Lewan, 
who may be the best lineman in the Big Ten: 
Taylor Lewan was wearing a walking boot.  He had a cast on his 
right wrist.  His elbow was bothering him. 
And he was complaining. 
. . . . 
. . . . 
That’s when senior center David Molk told the gregarious Lewan to 
shut up.  
Lewan said that was the best injury advice he’s ever received. 
“I was at practice one day, saying all kinds of words I can’t say in 
front of you guys, and Dave’s like, ‘What the hell are you doing? 
Why don’t you just stop talking about it, and it’ll go away?,’” 
Lewan said.  “I stopped talking about it, I stopped trying to limp, I 
stopped trying not to limp, and you just keep going. 
 
 179.  See, e.g., Jon Solomon, Internal NCAA Documents Reveal Lack of Oversight on 
Concussions, AL.COM (July 21, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/ 
07/internal_ncaa_documents_could.html (“documents released last week in a lawsuit against the 
NCAA show the concussion management plans have essentially not been enforced by college sports’ 
governing body.”).  
 180.  See id. 
 181.  See Kyle Meinke, Michigan’s Taylor Lewan Learns to Play Through Injury by Shutting Up, 
Growing Up, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/sports/um-
football/michigans-taylor-lewan-learns-to-play-through-injury-by-shutting-up-growing-up/. 
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“If you don’t talk about pain, it will go away.  That’s one thing 
Dave Molk taught me.” 
That helps to explain how Lewan’s been able to stay in the lineup 
despite his mounting injuries. 
Coach Brady Hoke said that kind of courage has given No. 22 
Michigan a lift—one it will need as it prepares to face the good 
defensive line of Illinois on Saturday (3:30 p.m., ABC). 
That is particularly true due to the ankle injuries sustained by 
starting left guard Ricky Barnum, which leaves the Wolverines with 
only one healthy reserve offensive lineman.  Hoke, when asked 
what he would do if Lewan went down as well, efforted [sic] a 
response before surrendering: “It would have been interesting.” 
But Lewan doesn’t like to talk about the pain, nor the praise he’s 
received for playing through it. 
“People keep talking about staying healthy and fighting through 
injuries and stuff, and I don’t know why everyone’s making a big 
deal out of it,” he said.  “I’m playing football, I’m an offensive 
lineman, that’s what I’m supposed to do.” 
“Everyone sees me limping on the field? That’s going to happen.  
I’m all beat up everywhere—but at the same time, so is everybody 
else.  At this point in the season, if you’re not hurt, you’re not 
playing, and I don’t want to be that guy.”182 
During the next season, 2012, Taylor Lewan once again fought through 
numerous injuries, eventually leaving the Ohio State game with a shoulder 
injury.183  Despite his injuries, Lewan echoed anew the “play through injury” 
and “win at all cost” culture that pervades big-time college football when he 
indicated that he would be ready for Michigan’s bowl game against the 
University of South Carolina: “‘I . . . can’t loom on those [injuries] too 
 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Kyle Meinke, Taylor Lewan Not Limited by Shoulder Injury Heading into Matchup with 
South Carolina’s Jadeveon Clowney, MLIVE.COM (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.mlive.com/wolverines/ 
index.ssf/2012/12/taylor_lewan_not_limited_by_sh.html.  
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much.  That kind of stuff is going to happen.  It’s the [twelfth] game of the 
season.  All that stuff happens for a reason, and you just got to keep 
playing.’”184  Taylor Lewan’s disregard for injuries, and his coach’s resulting 
praise, epitomizes the “play through injury” and “win at all cost” culture that 
dominates big-time college football and makes it very difficult to ensure 
student-athlete welfare.185    
Taylor Lewan’s obvious injuries, however, may be of less long-term 
significance than the number of sub-concussive blows he takes to his head as 
he returns to play game after game.  Any reputable concussion management 
plan is founded on tests that are designed to determine whether a concussion 
has occurred, by testing performance after a blow to the head.186  These 
protocols develop baseline mental testing done for each player (the baselines 
are tailored to each player) when they are healthy—free of brain injury—and 
prior to a concussive blow to the head.187  The problem is that “athletes [may 
be able to] sandbag their baseline scores without being detected.”188  In fact, 
coaches often reward such behavior as noted by ESPN’s Gregg Easterbrook:  
The core problem is that football coaches at the high school, college 
and professional levels are rewarded for winning games but not 
penalized for allowing their players to be harmed.  A coach who sits 
a player down out of concern for the player’s health may pay a 
price, if a game is lost.  A coach who sends a concussed player onto 
the field may never be penalized in any way if that player suffers 
another concussion.  Human beings respond to incentives, and right 
now the coaches’ incentive is to be irresponsible with players’ 
health.189 
Given this culture, and the commercialization of big-time college 
football that reinforces it, the NCAA’s response of leaving safety to the 
 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  See id. 
 186.  See McCrory et al., Concussion Management, CARLETON COLLEGE (2009), 
http://apps.carleton.edu/athletics/about/athletic_training/concussion/. 
 187.   Id. 
 188.  Kristi Erdal, Neuropsychological Testing for Sports-Related Concussion: How Athletes Can 
Sandbag Their Baseline Testing Without Detection, ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 
(June 8, 2012), http://acn.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/06/08/arclin.acs050.full. 
 189.  Gregg Easterbrook, Concussion Hazards Must Be Addressed, ESPN: PAGE 2 (Sept. 21, 
2010) [hereinafter Concussion Hazards], http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page= 
easterbrook/100921_tuesday_morning_quarterback&sportCat=nfl. 
[Vol. 41: 267, 2014] A Game Plan for the NCAA 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
296 
schools effectively means leaving it to the coaches, who are often the most 
powerful people on campus.190  An enforcement system that relies on 
coaches for enforcement is like asking the “fox to guard the henhouse” and 
is practically and morally indefensible.  The NCAA is promulgating strong 
safety rules and protocols,191 but it now must actually enforce them, 
particularly against the coaches and athletic and university personnel who 
defer to coaches in making—or refusing to make—such determinations. 
In describing its enforcement program, the NCAA notes that: 
The NCAA enforcement program strives to maintain a level playing 
field for the more than 400,000 student-athletes.  Commitment to 
fair play is a bedrock principle of the NCAA.  The NCAA upholds 
that principle by enforcing membership-created rules that ensure 
equitable competition and protect the well-being of student-athletes 
at all member institutions. 
The enforcement program is dedicated to creating positive student-
athlete experiences by preserving the integrity of the enterprise.  
The mission of the NCAA enforcement program is to reduce 
violations of NCAA legislation and impose appropriate penalties if 
violations occur.192   
While the NCAA has focused entirely on “maintain[ing] a level playing 
field,” it appears to recognize that it also has a role in protecting the “well-
being of student-athletes at all member institutions.”193  Indeed, when a 
university disregards player safety to win a game, it is also providing itself 
with a short-term competitive advantage over universities that protect their 
 
 190.  See, e.g., Timothy Davis & Keith E. Smith, Eradicating Student-Athlete Sexual Assault of 
Women: Section 1983 and Personal Liability Following Fitzgerald v. Barnstable, 2009 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 629, 662 (2009) (recognizing coaches’ “positions of influence and power”). 
 191.  See Ty Halpin, Committee Recommends Several Football Rules Proposals to Enhance 
Safety, NCAA (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/ 
Latest+News/2012/February/Committee+recommends+several+football+rules+proposals+to+enhan
ce+safety; Greg Johnson, NCAA Announces Tighter Targeting Rules to Take Effect in Upcoming 
Season, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2013-08-27/ncaa-announces-tighter-
targeting-rules-take-effect-upcoming-season (last updated Oct. 23, 2013).  
 192.  Enforcement, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 193.  Id. 
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student-athletes.194 
To protect student-athletes from head injuries, the NCAA must convert 
its fact sheet195 regarding concussions and its requirement of a       
concussion management plan196 into rules and an enforcement system 
designed to protect student-athlete welfare as aggressively as it currently 
protects against institutional efforts to gain a competitive advantage.  If a 
coach, team, or player refuses to abide by those standards and protocols—as 
the University of Arizona apparently did when it recently kept its star 
quarterback on the field despite his having suffered what clearly appeared to 
be serious head trauma in front of a national television audience197—an 
investigation should be initiated and any coaches and other personnel, 
including the student-athletes themselves, should be sanctioned if it is 
established that they disregarded safety protocols.  If a set of rules, 
guidelines, and protocols is adopted, a violation of them creates an unfair 
advantage for the offending team if it is not penalized.198  Even more 
significantly, playing an injured player evidences disregard of student-
athlete welfare, a core principle purportedly embraced by the NCAA. 
It was precisely this kind of reasoning that warranted the NCAA’s 
sanctioning of Penn State athletic and university personnel for failing to 
investigate and report on child sexual abuse by a former football coach—
abuse that occurred in their facilities.199  Reporting and dealing with known 
sexual abuse matters in a timely way could have adversely impacted the 
reputation and recruiting capacity of the Penn State football program.200  
Covering the abuse up helped Penn State retain its competitive advantage in 
 
 194.  See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 145. 
 195.  Concussion, supra note 144. 
 196.  NCAA Approach to Concussions, NCAA (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
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 198.  See id. 
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 200.  See Genaro Armas, Jerry Sandusky Charged with Sexual Abuse: Did Penn State Officials 
Tim Curley, Gary Schultz It Cover Up?, HUFFINGTON POST SPORTS (Nov. 7, 2011 11:20 PM), 
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recruiting, because reporting a former coach’s on-premises sexual abuse of a 
child would have harmed the reputation and recruiting capacity of the 
football program.201  It, therefore, was an appropriate area for sanctioning the 
University, coaches, and administrative personnel, who were involved in a 
cover-up effort to keep such sensitive information from the media and 
public. 
The NCAA recently adopted stiffer sanctions for violations of NCAA 
rules, which the NCAA described in the following fashion: “[v]iolator 
[b]eware: [p]enalties in [the] new enforcement structure pack a punch.”202  In 
describing the process, the NCAA reported that: 
Working group member David Williams, the vice chancellor for 
university affairs and athletics at Vanderbilt and a current member 
of the Division I Infractions Appeals Committee, said the group 
borrowed from a legal model to develop its matrix. 
“We provided a range, as is done with sentencing guidelines, where 
the judge has to pretty much stay within those unless there are 
extraordinary circumstances,” he said. 
In the new enforcement structure, there are four levels of violations, 
or “conduct breaches.”  The matrix is essentially designed to 
address Levels I and II (severe and significant breaches of conduct), 
which are the violations that most threaten the integrity of the 
collegiate model.  Violations can be “significant” when they have 
more than a passing consequence to the benefit of those who cheat.  
But they can escalate to “severe” if the violations are much broader 
and deeper in terms of who is implicated and the kind of behavior 
those people engaged in to get the result they did. 
The matrix lists a range of expected outcomes in various penalty 
categories for Level I and II cases that are processed normally (in 
the matrix, those are called “standard”).  Those ranges can change, 
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though, if there are mitigating or aggravating circumstances.203 
Examining a case in which a coach decides to leave a critical player in 
the game after he has evidenced signs of a concussion or serious head 
trauma—something akin to the Arizona case previously mentioned204—is 
illustrative.  In the Arizona case, the coach evidently disregarded both the 
NCAA’s fact sheet for dealing with possible concussions and the basic 
protocols included in a typical concussion management plan.205  The 
NCAA’s fact sheet for dealing with concussions and typical concussion 
management plans require, at a minimum, that: (1) the student-athlete should 
be removed from play—the student-athlete should not be permitted to just 
“shake it off” or play through the injury; (2) the student-athlete should be 
immediately evaluated and treated by an appropriate health care 
professional; (3) the student-athlete should only be permitted to return to 
play with permission from a health care professional with experience in 
evaluating head trauma and concussions, and; (4) coaches should develop a 
game plan that accounts for the amount of time a player may need to rest 
before returning to competition.206  A coach, any complicit administrative 
personnel, and perhaps even the player will be in serious violation of these 
basic standards if they: (1) fail to follow those basic steps or protocols; or (2) 
put pressure on the health care professional to disregard the potential for 
further injury and return the player to the field prematurely.  It is not clear in 
the Arizona example whether the coach placed any pressure on the health 
care professionals serving the team.207  Indeed, it appears that the coach 
simply avoided having the player examined by the health care professional 
who was present.208  In such an instance, it is clear that an investigation 
should be initiated to determine what happened.209 
Failing to follow well-recognized steps for dealing with head trauma 
and possible concussions or placing pressure on a health care professional to 
return a player to the field prematurely are both very serious violations of the 
NCAA Constitution.  NCAA Constitution Article 2.2, The Principle of 
 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See Diamond, supra note 145. 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  Concussion, supra note 144. 
 207.  See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
 208.  See Diamond, supra note 145. 
 209.  Cf. id. 
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Student-Athlete Well-Being, mandates that “[i]ntercollegiate athletics 
programs shall be conducted in a manner designed to protect and enhance 
the physical and educational well-being of student-athletes.”210  Article 2.2.3, 
in turn, provides: “[i]t is the responsibility of each member institution to 
protect the health of, and provide a safe environment for, each of its 
participating student-athletes.”211  Article 2.2.4 also recognizes a special 
relationship of trust between a student-athlete and his coach: “[i]t is the 
responsibility of each member institution to establish and maintain an 
environment that fosters a positive relationship between the student-athlete 
and coach.”212  Clearly, the juxtaposition of the student-athlete’s health and 
the coach’s responsibility to the student-athlete makes it clear that the 
NCAA intends that coaches be entrusted with caring for the health and well-
being of their players.  Therefore, if a coach returns a player to play 
prematurely—in a manner inconsistent with well-recognized protocols for 
dealing with head trauma and possible concussions—he has committed a 
serious violation of NCAA rules, thereby giving his team an unfair 
advantage.213 
Under the NCAA’s new, stiffer enforcement guidelines, when a coach 
jeopardizes a player’s health to gain a competitive advantage, particularly in 
the case of a possible head injury or concussion, the coach has engaged in 
what must surely be termed “severe” or “significant breach of conduct,” 
which constitutes a level I or II violation under the new enforcement 
scheme.214  A level I or II violation should result in an order to show cause of 
one to ten years for the coach, with the length of the order to show cause 
based on whether there are any mitigating factors.215  Orders to show cause 
are the stiffest penalty that can be invoked against a coach, because they 
directly limit a coach’s ability to continue coaching at the collegiate level.216  
In one sanctioning,217 for example, a seven year order to show cause 
 
 210.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 211.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 212.  NCAA CONST. art. 2.2.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 213.  See supra notes 194, 198 and accompanying text. 
 214.  New Violation Structure, NCAA,  http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/ 
DivisionI/Enforcement/New+Violation+Structure (last updated Aug. 1, 2013). 
 215.  Penalty Guidelines, Version No. 6, NCAA (Jul. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Penalty Guidelines], 
http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/penalty+guidelines; see Brown, supra note 
155.  
 216.  See Penalty Guidelines, supra note 215. 
 217.  MITTEN, ET AL., SPORTS LAW: GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION, supra note 5, at 191.  
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effectively ended the lengthy and largely successful—in terms of wins and 
losses—coaching career of Coach Clem Haskins, leading one commentator 
to refer to it as the “death penalty” for coaches.218  Such orders to show cause 
have been imposed in the NCAA’s infractions process on football coaches, 
including Jim Tressel, former head coach at Ohio State University, who also 
left college coaching.219  Such orders to show cause can be fashioned to fit 
the gravity of the violation.220 
If a coach is sanctioned for jeopardizing a student-athlete’s health and 
well-being by disregarding protocols for dealing with head trauma, the order 
to show cause should be clearly written to limit the coach’s capacity to 
coach at the collegiate level in the future.221  In a game that impacts the post-
season, the institution should also receive a post-season ban or another 
suitable penalty.222  Additionally, scholarship and recruiting limitation 
sanctions should be enforced, because a university with a football program 
that places a student-athlete’s health in jeopardy, particularly with regard to 
a head injury, should be limited in bringing other student-athletes into the 
program until the institution has demonstrated that it has regained 
institutional control over its program. 
Coaches are the primary culprits in maintaining the “play through 
injury” culture that often prevails in football programs,223 in clear violation 
 
 218.  Id. at 70–74.  
 219.  Id. at 68–73; NCAA COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011), available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2011/ 
ohio+state+coi+public+report. 
 220.  For example, writing for Sports Illustrated, Andy Staples claimed that the order to show 
cause against Coach Tressel was “flimsy,” asserting that: 
[T]he COI blew it in Tressel’s case.  The committee gave Tressel a five year show-cause, 
but the penalty only has teeth for the first five weeks of Tressel’s first season, when he 
must miss games.  He also must miss that season’s bowl game.  Tom, I saw your team on 
TV this season.  We could reanimate Vince Lombardi, put him on your sideline and your 
team might not make a bowl game in 2012.  So Tressel’s postseason ban is essentially 
meaningless in your case.  Basically, you can get one of the best coaches in the history of 
the game, and all it will cost you is five games and a progress report submitted to the 
NCAA every six months.  Tressel can still recruit.  He can still hire a staff.  All he has to 
do is sit out five weeks of meetings, practices and games. 
Andy Staples, A Modest Proposal: Hire Tressel After Flimsy Show-Cause Penalty, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 20, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy_staples/12/20/jim-
tressel-ohio-state-ncaa-sanctions/index.html#ixzz2Ox9JNgTR. 
 221.  Cf. id. 
 222.  Cf. id. 
 223.  Cf. NFL Football Poll: Playing Through the Pain, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/nfl-football-poll-playing-pain/2013/04/13/6b459cfa 
[Vol. 41: 267, 2014] A Game Plan for the NCAA 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
302 
of the NCAA Constitution.224  They often are also, as was the case with 
Coach Paterno at Penn State, the most powerful individuals on campus.225  
As such, they should receive very stiff penalties for disregarding the health 
and well-being of student-athletes.  If we are to break the “win at all costs” 
and “play through injury” mentality that prevails in the culture of college 
football,226 coaches—those on the front-line of the culture—must be held 
accountable for the health and safety of student-athletes placed in their 
care.227  They are not the only possible culprits, however.  Institutions (their 
athletic and academic administrative personnel) and sometimes even the 
players are also culprits or violators.228 
If the institution was or should have been aware of the coach’s disregard 
or practice of disregarding the health and well-being of a student-athlete, 
other institutional personnel should also be sanctioned for failing to penalize 
the coach.  For example, in the Taylor Lewan case noted above, Coach Hoke 
appeared at best indifferent to Lewan’s injuries, praising Lewan for his 
courage and leadership by playing through pain and injuries.229 In such a 
case, the University of Michigan is on notice that it has a coach who may be 
disregarding the well-being and health of his players.  At a minimum, it has 
an obligation to investigate and possibly report a violation on the part of 
Coach Hoke.  If athletic and university personnel fail to do so, they should 
be held accountable and sanctioned.230  A university with such violations 
should also be required to disclose in the recruiting process—on the letter of 
 
-a4a2-11e2-bd52-614156372695_page.html. 
 224.  See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 225.  See, e.g., Howard Bryant, Joe Paterno: Hard Lessons, Bitter Truths, ESPN (Jan. 22, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/bryant-120122/the-life-death-joe-paterno-
opportunity-re-evaluate-coaches-power. 
 226.  See Rodney K. Smith, Picking Politics and Football over Education, USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/01/03/penn-state-ncaa-sanctions-sandusky-tom-
corbett/1805189/. 
 227.  Cf. Associated Press, NCAA Approves Tougher Sanctions, ESPN (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8572310/ncaa-tougher-sanctions-rule-breakers.  
 228.  See NCAA, 2012–2013 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK [hereinafter SPORTS 
MEDICINE HANDBOOK], available at http://ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/MD12.pdf.  
 229.  See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.  
 230.  As a former college president, for example, if it had come to my attention, through the media 
or otherwise, that one of my coaches encouraged a player to play through injuries, I would ask for an 
immediate investigation and report from the athletic department.  If the report found that the coach 
had encouraged a player to play despite an injury, then I would insist that it be dealt with through the 
imposition of sanctions at the institutional level and reporting of the violation to our conference and 
the NCAA.  
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intent—the fact that they have been sanctioned for disregarding student-
athlete health and well-being.231  If medical personnel have acted in 
disregard of their responsibilities, they should also be penalized and the 
applicable medical licensing board should be made aware of that action.232  
Student-athletes—the players—can also be culprits.  Clearly, for 
example, if it can be established that a player faked baselines for concussion 
testing or engaged in some other deception to be able to return to play 
prematurely,233 that player should be subjected to serious sanctions.  
Teaching student-athletes to take responsibility for their health and well-
being is surely appropriate.  It must also be acknowledged that they often 
realize that if they fail to play through injuries, they risk the disfavor of their 
coach and loss of their starting position.234  Given the impressionability and 
immaturity of collegiate players, the major culprits surely are the coaches 
and the institutions that permit coaches to persist in their perpetuating of a 
“play through injury” and “win at all costs” culture.235 
It is in the NCAA’s and its member’s best interests to act decisively in 
this area.  If they act, they will be taking steps to avoid litigation,236 which 
could be very costly.  If the NCAA and its member institutions do not 
respond, it will become increasingly likely that a plaintiff will succeed in a 
case against them, because it is becoming more evident that the institutions 
and the NCAA are refusing to strictly abide by their own safety protocols 
and rules—they are putting winning, with its commercial and reputational 
rewards, above the welfare of their student-athletes.237  The first 
responsibility of the NCAA ought to be to the health and well-being of their 
 
 231.  Cf. Penalty Guidelines, supra note 215 (outlining other recruiting penalties). 
 232.  See SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 228, at 6–7 (“Member institutions should not 
place their sports medicine staffs in compromising situations by having them provide inequitable 
treatment in violation of their medical codes of ethics.  Institutions should be encouraged to 
incorporate questions regarding adequacy of medical care, with special emphasis on equitable 
treatment, in exit interviews with student-athletes.”). 
 233.  See Erdal, supra note 188. 
 234.  See Concussion, supra note 144 (emphasizing that potentially concussed student-athletes 
must be taken out of games by their coachces and must sit out of competition until cleared by a 
medical professional). 
 235.  See id. (noting that it is the responsibility of coaches to educate student athletes about 
concussions).  
 236.  Cf. Diamond, supra note 145 (noting that the NCAA “is being sued for failing to implement 
appropriate concussion screening”).  
 237.  See id. 
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students, and they should be willing to act accordingly.238 
4.  Compensating for Injuries 
Even after adopting safety rules, making scheduling changes to increase 
safety, and creating an enforcement process to protect the health and well-
being of student-athletes, the work of the NCAA will remain unfinished.  
There are present and former student-athletes who played college football 
who should receive compensation in some form for injuries incurred in the 
course of play.239  California recently recognized the need for universities to 
do more, when it adopted SB 1525—a Student Bill of Rights.240  SB 1525, 
among other things, requires universities with athletic programs that 
generate in excess of $10 million in media revenue to: (1)  “pay the 
insurance premiums that cover participation in the athletic program for each 
student athlete whose household has an income and asset level that does not 
exceed the level for Cal Grant A recipients”; and (2) “pay an insurance 
deductible amount for any student athlete injury that resulted from his or her 
participation in the athletic program, for up to 5 years after the date of the 
injury.”241  SB 1525, as adopted, also requires that universities provide 
continuing scholarships to injured players.242 Under SB 1525, student-
athletes receive two kinds of benefits: insurance against injury, if they 
cannot otherwise afford insurance; and compensation in the form of a 
scholarship, in the event that they suffer an injury that ends their 
participation.243 
Under the policies that drive SB 1525, student-athletes at commercially 
successful university athletic programs in California are essentially being 
treated like employees.  Those who play receive compensation in the form of 
guaranteed scholarships, even if injured.244 Scholarships are easily valued in 
 
 238.   See id.  
 239.  See Bill Pennington, When Injured Athlete Leaves Campus, College’s Responsibility Ends, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/sports/ncaabasketball/broken-leg-
renews-focus-on-college-athletes-health-insurance.html. 
 240.  PROJECT VOTE SMART, supra note 107. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. (“Requires an athletic program that does not renew an athletic scholarship of a student 
athlete who has been injured during his or her participation to provide an equivalent scholarship.”).  
 243.  Id.; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67450. 
 244.  See supra note 243. 
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the thousands of dollars.245  Student-athletes playing at financially lucrative 
universities in California also receive benefits in the form of insurance—if 
the student-athlete is not financially able to pay for it.246  This legislative 
intent or policy choice may evidence a commitment on the part of 
California, as a next step, to extend worker’s compensation benefits to 
student-athletes.  
According to a recent report prepared by ESPN’s Kristi Dosh, 
“[r]evenue among FBS football programs ranged from a high of $103.8 
million at Texas to a low of $3.6 million at the University of Louisiana at 
Monroe.  The average FBS football program brought in $25 million, with a 
median of $19.9 million.”247  With average revenues of approximately $20 
million per year, it is difficult to argue that student-athletes playing for FBS 
football programs should not receive compensation and benefits in some 
form, particularly if that form is designed to protect the health and safety of 
students.  With the addition of a national championship at the FBS level, 
revenues produced by FBS institutions are likely to increase dramatically,248 
which will provide big-time college programs with even more revenues that 
can be allocated to care for the needs of their student-athletes. 
Taylor Branch, a respected historian, wrote a particularly scathing 
article in The Atlantic in 2011,249 in which he chronicled a series of 
“scandals” that have undercut collegiate sports and argued that players 
should receive additional compensation: 
Critics scold schools for breaking faith with their educational 
mission, and for failing to enforce the sanctity of “amateurism.”  
 
 245.  At UCLA, the value of a full athletic scholarship for the 2012–2013 school year was 
approximately $54,000.  Justin Combs Scholarship: P Diddy’s Son, Gets $54,000 UCLA Football 
Scholarship, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/justin-
combs-scholarship_n_1563373.html.  At UC Berkeley, the value of a full athletic scholarship for the 
2013–2014 school year is approximately $56,400.  Undergraduate Student Budgets 2013–14, UNIV. 
OF CAL., BERKELEY, http://students.berkeley.edu/finaid/undergraduates/cost.htm (last visited Nov. 
21, 2013).  “The average value of a full scholarship at an in-state, public school is $15,000 a year.  
For an out-of-state public school, the average value is $25,000 a year.  Full scholarships at private 
schools average $35,000 a year.”  Athletic Scholarships, NCAA (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/How+Do+
Athletic+Scholarships+Work.. 
 246.  See supra notes 241–43. 
 247.  Dosh, supra note 16. 
 248.  See Gill, supra note 19; Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS, supra note 23. 
 249.  Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/5/. 
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Sportswriters denounce the NCAA for both tyranny and impotence 
in its quest to “clean up” college sports.  Observers on all sides 
express jumbled emotions about youth and innocence, venting 
against professional mores or greedy amateurs.  
For all the outrage, the real scandal is not that students are getting 
illegally paid or recruited, it’s that two of the noble principles on which the 
NCAA justifies its existence—”amateurism” and the “student-athlete”—are 
cynical hoaxes, legalistic confections propagated by the universities so they 
can exploit the skills and fame of young athletes.  The tragedy at the heart of 
college sports is not that some college athletes are getting paid, but that more 
of them are not.250 
Calls for compensating student-athletes, who are generating hundreds of 
millions of dollars in revenue in the FBS, are likely to increase until 
compensation in some form is provided for football student-athletes at that 
level.  In October of 2011, even NCAA President Mark Emmert called for 
increased compensation for student-athletes.251  President Emmert backed a 
proposal which would have allowed conferences to “increase grants to 
student-athletes by $2,000, ‘to more closely approach’ the full cost of 
attending college, beyond the athletic scholarships given for tuition, fees, 
room, board and books.”252  In addressing the Knight Commission, which is 
a leader in studying the reform of college athletics, Emmert is reported to 
have “noted that student-athletes have limited opportunities to work outside 
the classroom and playing fields, and that the current model of athletic 
scholarship hasn’t changed for 40 years.”253 
With dramatic increases in revenue in big-time, highly commercialized 
college football, and the passing of a generation since compensation, in the 
form of the athletic scholarship, has changed, the NCAA must act.  If the 
NCAA is proactive, rather than reactive, as has been its custom, it may avert 
the threat of litigation and can reclaim its reputation as an association that 
genuinely cares for its student-athletes, past and present. 
The best solution would be to develop a workers’ compensation-like 
system, whereby student-athletes who played at the FBS level will be 
 
 250.  Id.   
 251.  NCAA Pushes $2K Increase for Athletes, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/7143961/ncaa-weighing-2000-payments-student-athletes. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
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compensated for head injuries, including but not limited to CTE that appears 
later in life.  A no-fault system of this type would avoid litigation and could 
provide a measure of certainty for planning purposes for universities and 
players.  It would also avoid transactional costs, including major attorney’s 
fee awards, associated with litigation,254 thereby permitting funds to be 
focused on injured student-athletes, past and present.  Benefits should be 
afforded to players who have played at FBS schools since either: 1994, when 
the NCAA first published concussion guidelines; 2003, when their own 
study indicated the seriousness of concussions; or 2010, when they 
mandated Concussion Management Plans, because each of those dates 
reflect that the NCAA was well aware of the danger, in terms of head injury, 
that attends the playing of football at the FBS level.255  Under such a 
worker’s compensation-like system, a former college player who suffers 
CTE, dementia in some form later in life, that is arguably attributable to 
trauma suffered during his playing days, would be permitted to obtain 
medical care and some basic living expenses.  Former FBS student-athletes 
should also be provided with brain imaging and other preventative 
procedures designed to avoid or limit future brain damage. 
The best way to fund such a compensation system would be to create a 
trust, which would grow over time and be a source for paying future 
claims—that will surely come—as CTE manifests itself in the lives of 
former college players in the future.256  The fact that CTE is latent does not 
absolve the NCAA and its member institutions of their responsibility to care 
for injuries incurred in large part while playing football.  A source for such 
funding must be identified and allocated to the trust. 
The best source for such funding would be the BCS championship, 
especially given that the BCS anticipates an increased income stream of 
about $300 million per year in 2014, with the addition of a four-team 
national championship.257  If, for example, only half of that increase—$150 
million per year—was reserved to be placed in a trust to protect student-
 
 254.  See Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 152–54 (discussing the costs of 
litigation). 
 255.  See Waldron, supra note 77. 
 256.  See David DiSalvo, Is Malcolm Gladwell Right, Should College Football Be Banned to Save 
Brains?, FORBES (Jul, 21, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2013/07/21/is-
malcolm-gladwell-right-should-college-football-be-banned (discussing studies showing evidence of 
CTE in the brains of former college and professional football players). 
 257.  Mike Ozanian, BCS Playoff TV Deal Worth at Least $3 Billion, FORBES (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/05/29/bcs-playoff-tv-deal-worth-at-least-3-billion/.   
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athletes, it is likely that the trust would be sufficient to protect FBS players.  
If there is resistance to permitting a mere half of the anticipated increase to 
be used for the health and safety of FBS student-athletes, the national 
championship could be expanded, raising even more dollars that could be 
allocated to this purpose, while simultaneously increasing the coffers of FBS 
and BCS members dramatically.  Thus, the source of funding for the trust 
could easily be generated by providing for an eight or sixteen game national 
championship, leaving abundant new revenue for the FBS and BCS and their 
members to address what they most seem to crave—the building of new 
stadia and facilities, increasing the salaries of coaches and administrators, 
etc.  What is clear is that there is a source of new revenue that could easily 
fund a trust designed as part of a compensation system to deal with injuries, 
particularly head injuries, and to provide for the health and safety of student-
athletes.  The problem, therefore, is not one of resources—it is one of will 
and, sadly, greed. 
Even though a source of funding from new revenues exists,258 a number 
of issues must be addressed: (a) the greed or selfishness of the BCS and its 
members—their desire to have all the funds go back into their coffers, the 
coffers of major athletic programs, coaches, and personnel—makes it less 
likely that they will voluntarily permit the funds to be used for the purpose 
of compensating student-athletes; (b) the problem of increasing injuries 
through the scheduling of additional games in an effort to form an eight- or 
sixteen-team national championship, if that route is taken, as a means of 
creating a very significant new revenue stream or source of funds for such a 
trust; (c) the problem of limiting funding and compensation to student-
athletes who participated in FBS or major revenue-producing football 
programs, as was done in SB 1525 in California; and (d) Title IX and equity 
arguments that all student-athletes should be permitted to participate in the 
compensation system, which, through the expansion of the number of 
individuals to be compensated under the system, would threaten to bankrupt 
such a system. 
a.  Greed, the BCS, and Big-Time College Football 
Unlike the NCAA, which according to its own Constitution exists to 
 
 258.  See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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further the well-being of student-athletes,259 the BCS is designed to 
maximize profits to be distributed to its members by hosting a national 
championship in big-time, FBS college football.260  The BCS is neither an 
eleemosynary nor an academic, student-oriented, entity.261  It would appear 
that the BCS is really only a middleman, passing profits on to its members 
—its “shareholders”—under a bonus system, and that its members are 
responsible to use the funds for student welfare purposes.  That argument 
only further illustrates the problem, however, that the powerful, and for the 
most part academically respected, universities that control the BCS have no 
track record of using such funds to benefit their student-athletes in the ways 
discussed in this article.  Increased revenues largely are disbursed to the 
powerful BCS members262 who, in turn, use them to fund expansion of 
facilities, pay higher salaries for coaches and athletic personnel, and 
financially support other non-student-related purposes that are designed to 
separate those powerful BCS institutions from their competition and thereby 
protect their market share.263  In that process, it is clear that any benefits to or 
protection of student-athletes, who largely generate those funds through their 
play, are merely incidental.  
What is clear is that the BCS is, by design, unconcerned about student 
 
 259.  See Who is the NCAA?, NCAA (2012),  http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/11d98a804 
d5803658ac1be7c2d0d15b8/Who+is+the+NCAA.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=11d98a804d5
803658ac1be7c2d0d15b8 (“The NCAA seeks to prepare student-athletes to succeed at life by 
offering academic and athletics opportunities to help them achieve their full potential.”). 
 260.  See BCS Background, supra note 14; Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS, supra note 
23. 
 261.  See Dylan Williams & Chad Seifried, The Taxing Postseason: The Potential Impact of 
Unrelated Business Income Taxation on College Football Bowl Organizers, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECT 
SPORT 72, 77 (2013) (explaining that “bowl organizers operate independently from the NCAA” and 
that “several bowl organizations have begun to blur the lines between the purpose of a for-profit 
company and that which justifies a tax-exemption as an educational or charitable institution through 
some controversial activities”).  
 262.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 263.  The major BCS conferences receive the largest proportion of revenues, arguably because 
they play in the BCS designated bowls, which produce the revenue.  See, e.g., DAN WETZEL, JOSH 
PETER & JEFF PASSAN, DEATH TO THE BCS: THE DEFINITIVE CASE AGAINST THE BOWL 
CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (2010); Alabama-Notre Dame Blowout Highlights Complaints About BCS 
Selection Process, AT YOUR LIBRARY, http://atyourlibrary.org/sports/alabama-notre-dame-blowout-
highlights-complaints-about-bcs-selection-process (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  Questions have been 
raised regarding the fairness of the BCS selection process, arguing that the process is designed to 
favor the major conferences that run the BCS.  See Alabama-Notre Dame Blowout Highlights 
Complaints About BCS Selection Process, supra 263. 
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welfare issues.264  Students are not involved in the operations of the BCS,265 
other than being the workers who largely produce the revenues that fund 
BCS personnel and ends.  Funds are not allocated, other than indirectly at 
the whim of individual members, to student-athletes.  In short, the BCS 
exists, in some measure, as a conduit to deliver revenues to management, or 
its “shareholders,” and not to compensate student-workers, many of whom 
are student-athletes of color—largely African American—and are 
economically disadvantaged, which makes their exploitation appear racist 
and even more questionable.266  Taylor Branch’s critique of a lack of 
integrity on the part of the NCAA and collegiate sports is particularly telling 
with regard to the operation of the BCS, which is completely profit—not 
student—driven.267 
It is clear, nevertheless, that the BCS has a stranglehold on the largest 
single set of revenues that could be used to fund a meaningful student 
compensation system,268 and the powerful university members that control 
the BCS appear highly unlikely to permit those revenues to be used for 
student welfare concerns and diverted away from their efforts to maintain 
their competitive edge in big-time college football.  The NCAA plays at best 
a limited role, through its members, in determining how funds under the 
control of the BCS should be distributed.269 
In big-time (Division I) college basketball, on the other hand, the major 
 
 264.  Rodney K. Smith & Neil Millhiser, The BCS and Big-Time Intercollegiate Football Receive 
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 265.  See BCS Governance, BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (Oct. 29, 2013, 8:50 PM), 
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Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REV. 329, 348–50 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Ignorance Is Not 
Bliss]. 
 267.  See Branch, supra note 249. 
 268.  See generally Bowl Championship Series Five Year Summary of Revenue Distribution 2005–
06 Through 2009–10, NCAA (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ 
ncaa/pdfs/postseason+football/bowl+championship+series+five+year+summary+of+revenue+distrib
ution+2005+06+through+2009+10 (revealing total BCS revenue at over $155 million for 2009–
2010). 
 269.  See Associated Press, N.C.A.A. Chief Calls Role in Championship Limited, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-chief-calls-role-in-
championship-limited.html.  
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source of revenues for funding such a compensation program for basketball 
student-athletes would come from coffers under the control of the NCAA, 
because the NCAA itself oversees “March Madness.”270  The NCAA could 
implement such a funding system in big-time basketball; but, it cannot force 
the BCS to allocate funds to sources other than those determined by the 
BCS’s very powerful and financially successful programs which are either 
independent or represent major conferences, like Texas (Big 12), Michigan 
(Big 10), Georgia (SEC), and Notre Dame (independent).271  The BCS has 
facilitated and effectively protects these conferences and institutions in their 
effort to control and perhaps even monopolize the revenue stream from big-
time college football.272  With the growth of the power of the BCS, and its 
controlling members, the exploitation of student-athletes has expanded 
dramatically, as hundreds of millions of dollars are allocated each year with 
little or no thought being given to student health, safety, and well-being. 
With hundreds of millions in new and, as yet, unallocated revenue being 
anticipated in 2014 for television rights related to the national championship 
it sponsors,273 the BCS clearly has the revenue necessary to fund a trust that 
could provide benefits to compensate for injuries suffered while playing 
college football.  The BCS, however, will either have to be dismantled or 
strongly pressured into agreeing to the allocation of revenues for student 
welfare, compensation, and related concerns. 
The BCS could and probably should be dismantled by the members 
themselves, returning power to the NCAA to control the national 
championship as it does in all other sports, but the economic interests of 
those controlling member institutions and conferences make that unlikely.    
Dismantlement or consolidation of the BCS into the NCAA would be 
 
 270.  See Basketball Distribution Fund, NCAA (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Basketball+Resources/Basketball+Resource+Distribution+F
und. The NCAA already funds specific student-athlete benefit programs for basketball, including an 
injury surveillance program.  See NCAA Student-Athlete Benefits, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/public/NCAA/Finances/Finances+Student+Athlete+Benefits (last updated Feb. 13, 2013). 
 271.  See Bowl Championship Series Five Year Summary of Revenue Distribution 2005–06 
Through 2009–10, supra note 268. 
 272.  There is an ongoing argument about whether the BCS is monopolistic and violates antitrust 
law.  Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College 
Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the 
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000).  Even if it is not 
monopolistic in a legal sense, it is clear that the BCS dominates the market on behalf of the 
economic interests of its members.  Id. 
 273.  See Chris Smith, The Money Behind the BCS, supra note 23. 
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efficient.  The BCS is inefficient.  It duplicates costs by requiring a second 
organization other than the NCAA—the BCS—together with many bowl 
entities with their own additional administrative costs, to manage a highly 
lucrative championship and bowl series, rather than simply using the 
NCAA’s existing structure.274  Nevertheless, the powers that control the BCS 
and its ever-growing revenues have an economic interest in maintaining the 
BCS and insuring that its revenues continue to flow to its most powerful 
members.275  By ensuring that powerful institutions and a few major 
conferences receive the vast majority of revenues generated by the BCS, 
they maintain the competitive advantage and edge of those major institutions 
and conferences.  
Given the unlikelihood that the BCS and its powerful members will act, 
and the fact that the NCAA has no control over the BCS, the best remedy or 
way of dealing with the problem of greed is to have Congress hold hearings 
on compensating injured college football players.  Such hearings might 
pressure the powers that be in the BCS to relent, or at a minimum shame 
them into yielding up a measure of their power and revenues to benefit their 
student-athletes, who largely generate those funds.  Congress should also 
examine whether the NCAA should be given control over a national 
championship in football.  Finally, the hearings should also consider student-
athlete health and compensation issues, because action on those issues is 
inhibited by the current BCS stranglehold over revenues that could be used 
to protect the health and welfare of student-athletes.  
b.  Scheduling and Adding Games for a National Championship 
 If the BCS, or preferably the NCAA, moved to an eight or sixteen team 
national championship, it would clearly produce a new revenue stream, a 
portion of which would be sufficient to fund insurance and compensation for 
FBS level college football players.  Adding games, however, would increase 
the likelihood of injuries and could present new student-athlete health and 
welfare concerns.  Playing a few additional games would clearly increase the 
number of times when players on participating teams would suffer 
 
 274.  The NCAA has extensive experience conducting championships.  See, e.g., Championships, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/championships/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2013). 
 275.  See 2009–10 Revenue Distribution Data, BCS (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.bcsfootball.org/ 
news/story?id=4856975 (providing an example of how the BCS allocates money). 
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concussions and blows or trauma, and, thus, sub-concussive head injury—
the major known cause of CTE and future brain impairment.276 
A four-team playoff adds only one game for two teams.  An eight-team 
playoff would add one additional game for four teams and two additional 
games for two teams, with the teams in the championship playing a game 
that is currently scheduled.  A sixteen-game playoff would add even more 
games for a number of schools.  Interestingly, the post-season has the lowest 
injury rate, with 4.2 injuries per 1,000 athlete exposures, as compared to 7.5 
injuries per 1,000 athlete exposures during the season.277  However, with 
regard to CTE, which is latent and not a part of those statistics,278 the 
additional practices and games involved in a national championship would 
be a source of multiple new or additional sub-concussive blows to the head. 
A simple answer would be to shorten the season, as is done at the 
Division II (D-II) and Division III (D-III) levels, to accommodate a national 
championship.279  Under a ten game regular (and shortened) season schedule 
(rather than twelve, as is presently the case), for example, there would be far 
fewer games played and fewer instances of trauma to the head.  Thus, if 
there were a sixteen-team playoff, sixteen teams would play eleven games, 
eight of those teams would play twelve games, four of the teams would play 
thirteen games, and only two teams would play fourteen games.  The net 
number of games played by FBS schools would drop dramatically.280  
The question remaining would be whether revenues lost from the 
playing of those additional games would decrease net revenues to teams 
sufficiently to render such a proposal unviable.  A study should be 
commissioned to determine whether the added revenues from an expanded 
 
 276.  See Zeigler, supra note 43. 
 277.  NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, supra note 39, at 1. 
 278.  See Zeigler, supra note 43 (“Unfortunately, at this time, there are no specific markers or 
tests to detect CTE in a living athlete.  Currently, CTE is diagnosed through studying brain tissue 
under a microscope after death.”). 
 279.  D-II and D-III football each have a maximum of five playoff games per school.  Division II 
Football Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/interactive-bracket/football/d2 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013); Division III Football Bracket, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/interactive-bracket/football/d3 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 280.  In 2012–2013, there were 120 universities (teams) in the FBS.  Division I Facts and Figures, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/DivisionI/DI+Facts+and+Figures 
(last updated May 2, 2013).  Dropping a regular season schedule from twelve to ten games would, 
therefore, translate into a decrease of 240 games.  Clearly, this reduction in games, and the practices 
that attend them, would dramatically decrease the number of concussions and head trauma occurring 
in FBS football.  
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playoff would be sufficient to offset losses, while also providing a revenue 
stream for funding a compensatory trust and insurance for players.  Student-
athlete welfare concerns, at a minimum, merit study of such a proposal.  The 
resultant data would help academic leaders determine whether such a 
championship system would be economically viable.  It is clear that it would 
be beneficial in terms of student-athlete safety and health. 
c.  Limiting Compensation to FBS Student-Athletes 
The compensation proposal in this article is limited to student-athletes 
participating at the FBS level.  The FBS produces significant revenue,281 and 
the participating student-athletes are major factors in generating that 
revenue.282  The cost that would attend extending such compensation to 
student-athletes playing football at other levels—FCS, D-II, and D-III 
levels—and to student-athletes participating in other non-revenue-producing 
sports would be very high, rendering such a proposal to compensate student-
athletes who participate in sports that do not generate significant revenue 
economically unrealistic.283  The revenue generated at the FBS level is 
attributable in significant measure to the efforts and talent of student-athletes 
participating at that level.284  Student-athletes producing such significant 
revenues ought to be treated more like employees than their counterparts in 
non-revenue-producing sports.  In some measure, requiring money they earn 
to pay for other sports would merely constitute further exploitation of those 
playing football at the most competitive and commercially productive 
level.285  Such exploitation of student-athletes, many of whom are of color, 
may also raise issues of racism.286  
Men’s basketball at the D-I level also generates significant revenue, and 
 
 281.  Revenues & Expenses 2004–2010:  NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs 
Report, NCAA 20 (Aug. 2011), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/ 
2010RevExp.pdf (FBS institutions generated a median revenue of $35.3 million for 2010). 
 282.  See Gill, supra note 19. 
 283.  See Revenues & Expenses 2004–2010:  NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs 
Report, supra note 281 (FCS institutions generated a median revenue of $3.3 million for 2010, and 
largest reported generated revenue was $18.7 million for the same year). 
 284.  See Gill, supra note 19 (stating that the players were the “main bowl ingredient” to the 2010 
BCS bowl games that generated a reported $1.2 trillion for host cities). 
 285.  See Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss,  supra note 266, at 348–50 (stating that using profits from 
revenue-producing sports to fund other sports raises questions of exploitation). 
 286.  See, e.g., id. at 348; MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW: GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION, supra 
note 5, at 707–21. 
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it does so using fewer student-athletes (employees) than football.287  In 2009, 
for example, both Duke and Louisville generated over $25 million in 
revenue.288  That is about $2 million in revenue per player.  Men’s 
basketball, however, is not included in the compensation proposal 
recommended in this article.  This article focuses on dealing with head 
injuries, which are far more common in football than basketball.289  Men’s 
basketball at the highest levels, in terms of revenue production, should 
nevertheless consider creating a compensation system that fits the needs of 
its student-athletes. 
Student-athletes playing football at the less commercially profitable 
FCS, D-II, and D-III levels also suffer concussions and trauma to the head.290  
The rule changes and scheduling recommendations in this article291 should 
apply at those levels.  Safety rules and strong protocols—limiting re-entry to 
play on the part of student-athletes who have suffered a concussion or 
serious trauma to the head—must be applied strictly at all levels.  
Additionally, enforcement of such rules and protocols, or safety procedures, 
should be as vigorous at those levels as at the FBS level.  Except in the case 
of playoffs, keeping the number of games down to nine or fewer and 
shortening the length of the season also makes great sense within those non-
revenue producing levels.  Any revenues generated at those lower levels by 
the playing of additional games are not significant and are certainly 
outweighed by student health and safety concerns.292 
Student-athletes playing at the FBS, FCS, D-II, and D-III levels should 
all receive information regarding head injuries suffered by student-athletes at 
 
 287.  NCAA CONST. arts. 15.5.5.1, 15.5.6.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 34, at 206–
07 (limiting scholarships to thirteen per school for Division I men’s basketball programs, while 
allowing eighty-five per school for FBS football programs). 
 288.  Patrick Rishe, Duke, Louisville, North Carolina Generate the Most College Basketball 
Revenue, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/03/07/duke-
louisville-north-carolina-generate-the-most-college-basketball-revenue/2/. 
 289.  See SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 228, at 53 (“In the years 2004 to 2009, the 
rate of concussion during games per 1,000 athlete exposures for football was 3.1 . . . and for men’s 
basketball 0.6”); Patient Information: Sports-Related Head Injury, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL 
SURGEONS, http://www.aans.org/Patient%20Information/Conditions%20and%20Treatments/Sports-
Related%20Head%20Injury.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 290.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Guskiewicz et al., Cumulative Effects Associated with Recurrent 
Concussion in Collegiate Football Players: The NCAA Concussion Study, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2549 (2003) (listing some statistics on football-related head injuries at various collegiate division 
levels), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=197667.  
 291.  See supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 292.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
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that level prior to commencing play.  The facts regarding head injuries, 
including the possibility of CTE later in life, should be documented, 
generally and at the institutional level.  Student-athletes should then sign a 
waiver indicating that they are aware of these facts before being permitted to 
participate.  If they are minors, their parents or legal guardians should add 
their signatures to the disclosure and waiver form. 
d.  Title IX and Equity Arguments Against Compensation 
If compensation is provided to football players at the FBS level, 
arguments will be raised asserting that compensating and insuring these 
student-athletes, while not providing similar compensation to other student-
athletes, is inequitable.293  In particular, it will be asserted that women are 
being treated inequitably, in violation of Title IX.294  Women playing soccer, 
for example, which involves serious head trauma related to heading the 
ball,295 would assert that they need compensation and insurance as much as 
their male counterparts.  
There are two primary responses to this assertion of gender inequity and 
allegations that Title IX is being violated: (1) women’s sports generally are 
not revenue-generating sports, as is the case with the FBS, and the 
distinction is not between men and women but is revenue based; and (2) the 
FBS athletes who generate millions of dollars in revenue are often persons 
of color or are from lower socio-economic groups, and failing to compensate 
them constitutes exploitation.296  Furthermore, if women’s sports begin to 
generate revenue, the student-athletes in those sports will be in a position to 
argue that they should be treated more like employees, for compensation, 
and a more equitable distribution of revenues they help generate.297 
Many universities at the FBS level currently demand that their athletic 
 
 293.  See, e.g., Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266, at 342–45. 
 294.   Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 295.  See Heading in Soccer Raises Concerns of Brain Injury, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 18, 2013), http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/soccer-brain-injury-heading_n_3456009.html 
(stating that soccer players who head the ball frequently are subject to head-related injuries). 
 296.  See Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266, at 349. 
 297.  At present, achieving consistent profitability seems to be the exception, not the norm, in 
women’s college sports.  See, e.g., Chris Smith, When It’s Okay to Lose Money: The Business of 
Women’s College Basketball, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Chris Smith, When It’s Okay to 
Lose Money], http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/29/when-its-okay-to-lose-money-the-
business-of-womens-college-basketball/. 
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programs be treated as “profit centers,” with the expectation that funds 
generated by the athletic program will cover the costs of all sports and 
operations within the entire athletic program.298  That typically translates into 
using funds generated by men’s football and basketball to fund other non-
revenue-producing men’s and women’s sports, including scholarships, 
travel, coaches’ salaries, facilities, etc.299  In essence, funds generated by 
male athletes, who are often poor and persons of color, are used to achieve 
equity.300  It has been argued that such a funding system is racially and 
economically exploitive and creates tension between racial and gender 
equity.301  Permitting some special compensation for athletes producing 
those revenues, therefore, would seem to be a wise balance between equities: 
non-revenue-producing women’s and men’s programs will continue to be 
funded, while revenue-producing football programs will be permitted to 
provide their student-athletes with basic compensation and protection. 
It is highly doubtful that such arguments will sway the most ardent 
proponents of Title IX and gender equity.  Advocates of gender equity can 
assert with some force that past discrimination against women has 
contributed to the fact that women’s sports are not able to produce the same 
revenue stream as men’s sports, particularly football, which is and has 
historically been a male-dominated sport.302  It is likely, therefore, that 
potentially costly litigation will threaten this proposal.  
In light of the above, it is recommended that Congress, as part of the 
hearings recommended in this article,303 exempt this compensation system 
from Title IX limitations.  Such a determination will be difficult politically, 
because it will be opposed by women’s groups, but it will also receive 
support from groups concerned about exploitation of student-athletes within 
the FBS.304  It is possible, as well, that some compromise beyond the scope 
of this article can be fashioned by people of good intention, who understand 
 
 298.  See Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266, at 348 (suggesting that funds from 
revenue-producing sports “largely fund the entire operations of the NCAA”). 
 299.  See id. 
 300.  Id. at 349. 
 301.  See generally Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266. 
 302.  See, Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266, at 342–43; Bob Cook, For National 
Girls and Women in Sports Day, More Evidence Fighting Title IX is Losing Battle, FORBES (Feb. 1, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2012/02/01/for-national-girls-and-women-in-sports-day 
-more-evidence-fighting-title-ix-is-losing-battle/. 
 303.  See supra Part III.A.4.a. 
 304.  See Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss, supra note 266, at 348–49, 359. 
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the value of gender equity, racial equity, and the harms that attend economic 
exploitation.  To help move this process along, funds already being 
transferred from commercially successful men’s programs—football and 
basketball at the most competitive levels—to other, non-revenue-producing 
sports should be documented.  Furthermore, additional funds might be 
allocated to assist with promoting non-revenue sports that are most likely to 
generate revenues, such as women’s basketball.305 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s reputation, particularly in the enforcement area, may be at 
an all time low, as evidenced by the NCAA’s own recent report 
acknowledging that significant errors have been made.306  With concern over 
head injuries and exploitation of football players at the FBS level rising, the 
NCAA must be proactive in order to avoid a further crisis.  It is doubtful that 
the NCAA, as we know it, can survive a major public relations debacle 
related to its failure to act to protect the health and well-being of its student-
athletes—something that is mandated by its own Constitution.  It must 
address the “play through injury” and “win at all costs” culture in college 
football which its inaction has facilitated.  If the NCAA persists in failing to 
act, a single, tragic death that could have been avoided, or even a serious 
head injury, in the future might trigger a media frenzy, which could threaten 
the very survival of the NCAA and college football as we know it.307 
The NCAA must cease to be purely reactive in developing its policies 
regarding concussions and head injuries suffered in college football.  It must 
take steps to ensure the safety and well-being of college football players.  If 
the NCAA refuses to sanction coaches, personnel, programs, and institutions 
for violations of student health and safety, it will surely be subjected to 
increased litigation for failing to abide by its own constitution to the 
detriment of its student-athletes.  Member institutions will also be sued for 
failing to follow guidelines and protocols that have been in existence for 
many years. 
If the NCAA fails to take action, Congress should follow President 
 
 305.  See Chris Smith, When It’s Okay to Lose Money, supra note 297. 
 306.  People who attack the NCAA seldom indicate who might do the work of the NCAA if it 
were displaced.  It is clear that an organization like the BCS would be worse, not better, than the 
NCAA in terms of insuring student-athlete well-being.  See supra, Part III.A.4.a. 
 307.  See Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem, supra note 9, at 172–73. 
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Obama’s lead in questioning the handling of concussions and head injuries 
in college football by holding hearings on H.R. 2903 or other legislation 
designed to deal with this very serious problem.  Congress has held hearings 
that have spurred the NFL into action, and it must play a similar role in 
protecting college football players at all levels from head injuries.  Congress, 
together with the Executive Branch, can also play a critical role in protecting 
student-athletes at the FBS level from exploitation by working with the 
NCAA to develop a viable compensation proposal along the lines suggested 
in this article, all in an effort to protect student-athletes and salvage college 
football. 
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*** 
